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ABSTRACT 
The international system of the twenty-first century calls for new ways to resolve 
conflicts.  Traditional influence strategies, such as deterrence and compellence, have 
undergone new revisions to conform to new challenges.  A third strategy, reassurance, 
has demonstrated its potential in recent interstate conflicts after rarely being used during 
the Cold War.  A strategy of reassurance involves one state’s actions to increase the 
security of an adversary by helping the adversary in an issue that the adversary deems 
important.  If the actions convince the adversary that the reassurer seeks peace, and the 
adversary also seeks peace, then the adversary reciprocates by sending an equally 
reassuring signal, completing an exchange that may lead to cooperation. This thesis 
analyzes the process of reassurance, using four modern case studies.  In two of these case 
studies, one state’s signal of reassurance was reciprocated, leading to a reduction in 
tensions.  In the other two, the signal of reassurance was not reciprocated, leading to 
further tensions.  This thesis seeks to find which conditions surrounded the successful 
cases.  It will reveal that when benign intentions are made transparent through rhetoric, 
and when signals are perceived as costly, an adversary is more likely to reciprocate 
signals of reassurance. 
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  REASSURANCE AS AN 
INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
A. PURPOSE 
Reassurance is an influence strategy in international relations whereby a state 
attempts to reduce tensions by undertaking an action that improves its adversary’s 
security.  If the strategy is successful, the adversary sends a reciprocal signal, completing 
a reassurance exchange that may lead to cooperation.  In addition to a reciprocal signal, 
other types of responses may also follow an attempt to provide reassurance.  History has 
demonstrated that measures intended to provide reassurance have at times been 
reciprocated, other times ignored, and sometimes even exploited.  This thesis seeks to 
find the causes for the diverse outcomes of reassurance.  The main question it seeks to 
address is: Under what conditions are signals of reassurance reciprocated? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The unexpected end of the Cold War sparked a new debate over influence 
strategies like reassurance.  Specifically, international relations (IR) scholars offered new 
and competing explanations for the unexpected de-escalation of tensions between the 
Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s.  Gorbachev’s pledge to destroy a 
great part of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal, his massive troop reductions in 1988, and his 
moratorium on nuclear tests, brought about rapprochement and reciprocal gestures from 
the West.1  Post-revisionist scholars have depicted this rapprochement as a successful 
example of reassurance. They argue that these exchanges of reassurance built trust by 
convincing each state that reciprocated cooperation was preferable to nuclear war.2  
Trust is the desired outcome of reassurance. However, in an anarchical 
international system where stakes are high, states are reluctant to begin a reassurance 
exchange from a position of mistrust.  IR scholars have proposed several conditions that 
 
1 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma:  Realism, Reassurance, and the 
Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31:2 (2006), 179–180.   
2 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton:  Princeton University press, 
2005), 184. 
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enhance the possibility of building trust, both before and after the employment of 
reassurance strategy.  This thesis seeks to compile these conditions and test them.  It will 
do this by completing a case study analysis that will seek to determine which of the 
proposed conditions (independent variables) are present in cases where signals of 
reassurance are reciprocated (dependent variable) and which are not. 
One of the most important contributions of this thesis involves addressing the 
potential of reassurance by redefining it to conform to a more modern, post-Cold War 
definition.  The evolution of security studies has caused all influence strategies to get a 
twenty-first century update.  Reassurance is no exception.  The case studies in this thesis 
may uncover non-traditional examples of reassurance that are appropriate today because 
of the evolution of the international security environment.  Once the concept is defined, 
the case studies will highlight which conditions increase the chances that a state will 
reciprocate a signal of reassurance.  Policymakers can look for evidence of any of these 
conditions as they interact with their counterparts in other nations.  Understanding the 
conditions that increase the likelihood of reciprocation can help a policymaker in his or 
her decision to use reassurance alone, or in conjunction with other influence strategies 
such as deterrence, compellence, or positive incentives. If the conditions indicate that a 
reassurance signal is not likely to be reciprocated, then the choice of a different influence 
strategy may be more appropriate.  If the conditions indicate that a reassurance signal is 
likely to be reciprocated, then a signal of reassurance may avoid a future war.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Reassurance has not been explored as fully as other IR strategies like deterrence 
or compellence.  IR scholar Andrew Kydd writes “reassurance has been accorded only 
sporadic attention in the field of international relations.”3  The limited literature on 
reassurance offers wide-ranging arguments regarding its importance in IR.  On one 
extreme, Janice G. Stein (an advocate of reassurance) defines “reassurance strategies” as 
“a set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of resorting to the 
 
3 Andrew Kydd,  Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton:  Princeton University press, 
2005), 185. 
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threat of force.”4  On the other extreme, Evan B. Montgomery (a skeptic of reassurance) 
defines it as “an unexplained effect of reduced uncertainty, as well as a cause of it.”5   
The debate regarding the effectiveness of reassurance centers on the security 
dilemma and a state’s willingness to cooperate in an environment of uncertainty.6  
Considering the literature on the subject (summarized in the next section), one initial 
hypothesis is that reassurance signals are most likely reciprocated when the initiating 
state is the weaker adversary.  Stronger states are more apt to cooperate but less apt to 
initiate a process of cooperation.  The stronger state that receives the weaker state’s 
signal is more likely to deem the weaker reassurer as trustworthy and worthy of a 
reciprocating signal.  A second hypothesis from the literature is that transparency, though 
desirable, does not always cause a reciprocation of reassurance signals.  Robert Jervis 
points out that misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions may include a 
misunderstanding that a signal of reassurance is actually a “result of fear and weakness.”7    
A third hypothesis is that, although determining whether a signal is costly enough 
to merit a reciprocation falls on the receiver, it is the sender that carries the burden of 
designing a signal that is meaningful to the receiver.  This is a modification to the 
traditional concept of reassurance, which will be explained in Chapter II.  Finally, 
internal domestic issues, such as an insurrection, or the unpopularity of a government, 
can force a state to reassure its international adversaries for fear of isolation or attack.  A  
 
4 Janice G. Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, ed. Tetlock, 
Philip, et al. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1991), 31. 
5 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma:  Realism, Reassurance, and the 
Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31:2 (2006), 161. 
6 Ken Booth, and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma:  Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 1. The security dilemma is a well-studied IR term that is 
well explained in this book.  Essentially, security-seeking states are faced with the daunting task of 
correctly interpreting other states’ intentions (dilemma of perception), and deciding on how to react to 
those perceptions (dilemma of response).  
7 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 85.  His example of this problem is Hitler’s misperception that “Chamberlain was 
conciliatory [by signing the Munich Agreement] not because he felt Germany would be sated, but because 
he lacked the resolve to wage a war to oppose German domination of the continent.”  Chamberlain felt he 
was being transparent in his intentions to give Hitler one last concession.  Hitler misunderstood the signal 
and the result was war. 
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problem with this fourth hypothesis is that sometimes the opposite happens.  Leaders 
sometimes use a dispute as a rallying cry of nationalism, and escalate tensions just to 
unify the citizenry.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first modern IR scholar to argue the merits of reassurance was Charles 
Osgood in the 1960s.  The expert on Cold War issues posed two questions while the 
nuclear race was at its peak:  “would it be possible for this country to take the initiative in 
reducing mistrust?  Could we transform the spiral of fear into a spiral of hope?”8  
Osgood’s Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy consisted of 
using the same IR logic behind a tense arms race to propose a tension-decreasing 
possibility.9  If an arms race is a “tension-increasing” system where adversaries are in a 
“spiral of fear,” then a state that reverses “one of the characteristics of an arms 
race….may be able to transform it into a spiral of trust.”10  The challenge is that “it is 
necessary to indicate the characteristics the unilateral initiatives in such a program must 
have in order to maintain adequate felt security while at the same time inducing 
reciprocative behavior from an opponent.”11  This psychological approach to reassurance 
will be explained in detail in Chapter II.   
Robert Jervis has argued the merits of reassurance from a more rational and less 
psychological angle.  His “spiral theory” argues that states that feel insecure seek greater 
relative military strength only to feel more confident.12  Thus, when a state does 
something that increases the adversary’s security, it thereby decreases the adversary’s 
desire to seek a greater military arsenal.  Jervis writes, 
 
 
8 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 1962), 6. 
9 Ibid., 87. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 89. 
12 Ibid., 80.   
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. . one state must take an initiative that increases the other side’s security.  
Reciprocation is invited and is likely to be forthcoming because the 
initiative not only reduces the state’s capability to harm the other but also 
provides evidence of its friendly intentions.13 
This summary provides the rational approach to reassurance.  It is in line with 
Osgood’s argument that a signal of reassurance “breaks” a negative spiral or reverses one 
of the characteristics fueling the tensions.  But Jervis argues that because most policies 
are based on rational assessments, it is hard and at times impossible to break a spiral. 
While an understanding of the security dilemma and psychological 
dynamics will dampen some arms-hostility spirals, it will not change the 
fact that some policies aimed at security will threaten others.  To call the 
incompatibility that results from such policies ‘illusory’ is to 
misunderstand the nature of the problem and to encourage the illusion that 
if the states only saw themselves and others more objectively they could 
attain their common interest. 14 
Jervis’ argument goes to the heart of the never-ending debate between realists, 
idealists, and constructivists.  If two states seek security, and one sends a signal to 
another to demonstrate that it only seeks security and not aggression, the reassuree has to 
determine if the signal is an authentic attempt to reduce tensions, or if the signal is bait 
from which a reciprocal signal would be exploited.  Constructivists “maintain that it is 
possible to initiate interactions that transform state identities; one possible result of this is 
that fear can be allowed to evaporate as states grow in confidence about the peaceful 
intentions of others.”15  But because of the risks, mistrust has traditionally been the 
prudent posture.16  Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler write, “given the stakes involved, 
the existence of weapons in the hands of one state can provoke at least uncertainty and 
possibly of real fear in others even when those weapons are not intended to be used 
except for self protection. . .”17  Offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer use this 
 
13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations, 82.  
14 Ibid., 76. 
15 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma:  Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics, 105. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
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inevitability to downplay the role of reassurance because they assume that every state is 
greedy, aggressive, and seeks power out of fear that others will attack them if they don’t.   
. . .in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other 
and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at 
least suspicious of other states and be reluctant to trust them. . . Because it 
is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample 
reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them.18  
Mearsheimer concludes that there would be little room for reassurance because 
trust is hard to garner in an international system.  A state that reassures is likely to be 
exploited.  In contrast, defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that states prefer 
balances of power over offensive actions to maximize their own security.  
In anarchy, security is the highest end.  Only if survival is assured can 
states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. . . The 
first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their 
positions in the system.19 
Waltz leaves a small window for reassurance by emphasizing that survival and security—
not power—are a state’s highest priorities.  If states increase each others’ perceived 
probability of survival by reassuring each other, then reassurance is beneficial.   
Andrew Kydd defines reassurance as the “process of building trust.”20  He writes 
that “trust is established and fostered by small, unilateral cooperative gestures that initiate 
chains of mutually rewarding behavior.”21  He focuses on a “rational choice approach” 
that considers “costly signals” the main component of reassurance.  In fact, Kydd calls 
the entire subject, “the costly signal theory of reassurance” because it focuses “on the 
sending and interpretation of costly signals.”22  According to Kydd, costly signaling is 
the condition for reassurance to work.  He defines costly signals as “signals designed to 
 
18 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton & Company), 
32.  
19 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International politics (London:  McGraw Hill, 1979), 126. 
20 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton:  Princeton University 
press, 2005), 184. 
21 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54:2 (2000):  
333. 
22 Ibid., 326. 
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persuade the other side that one is trustworthy by virtue of the fact that they are so costly 
that one would hesitate to send them if one were untrustworthy.”23  These signals should 
demonstrate that a state “. . . is moderate, not out to get the other side, willing to live and 
let live, preferring to reciprocate cooperation.”24  Costly signaling is one of the 
independent variables to be tested in this thesis. 
The dilemma that states face when considering costly signals is the resulting 
increase in their vulnerability.  Evan Montgomery, a skeptic of reassurance, argues that 
while a costly signal may convince an adversary to reciprocate, the reassurer may not be 
able to defend against “greedy states that might choose to attack—a heightened 
possibility if the signaling state appears less willing or able to defend itself.”25  With this 
dilemma in mind, Kydd writes,  
The signals cannot be too cheap, or untrustworthy types will send them 
too in an effort to lull the other side. They cannot be made too costly, or 
the trustworthy types will be afraid to send them lest the other side turn 
out to be untrustworthy.26 
Kydd proposes that reassurance strategy will only work on security seekers: 
 
Security-seeking states tend to be liberal democracies and non-
democracies with limited aims or capabilities.  No one thinks that France 
might decide to launch a renewed bid for control of Southeast Asia after 
the next election, or that Britain will attempt to retake South Africa if the 
Conservatives defeat the Labor party. . . Other states are more volatile, 
especially dictatorships run by mercurial leaders such as Libya.27  
Interestingly, even Libya has been involved in a period of reassurance and 
cooperation with the West (Italy in particular) because of the impact of domestic politics.  
Charles Glaser focuses on the impact of domestic politics on reassurance.  Glaser agues 
that a state’s moderates will point to a reassurance signal as a sign of a state’s “benign 
 
23 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation, 326. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Evan Montgomery, “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma:  Realism, Reassurance, and the 
Problem of Uncertainty,” 159. 
26 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 188. 
27 Ibid., 203–204. 
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motivations.”  Meanwhile, the same state’s hard-liners may cite the same signal as 
evidence of a state’s “lack of resolve.”28  The prevailing perception will depend on who 
is in charge.  In the case of Libya, Mu’amar Qadhafi decided in 1999 to side with the so-
called Libyan pragmatists, who favored Libya’s reintegration in the international 
community.  He agreed that Libya would demonstrate its “benign motivations” by 
handing over the two alleged masterminds of the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attack.29   
Deborah Larson argues that by human nature, “mistrust is not easily overcome.  
States may build trust by negotiating small agreements that enable them to test each 
other’s sincerity at lowered risk.”30  This logic goes against Kydd’s costly signal 
argument, because lower risk signals that may begin a reassurance exchange are by 
nature, not costly.  Larson also argues that to build trust, “a state should also maintain a 
consistent policy, because people tend to believe that a state's actions in different areas, 
no matter how desperate the circumstances, reveal its underlining motives.”31   
On the willingness to cooperate, Jervis states that “the costs of exploitation 
decrease as states’ vulnerabilities decrease.  If states are strong enough so that a few 
defections cannot cripple them, they can better afford to take chances on cooperation.”32  
In other words, a strong state is more likely to cooperate.  There is a subtle difference 
between reassurance and cooperation.  Cooperation can take place once a process of 
reassurance begins.  In other words, states may choose to cooperate after an initial 
reassurance exchange.  Using Jervis’ argument, the stronger of two adversaries is more 
willing to reciprocate a signal from the weaker state because even an exploitation of a 
reciprocal signal will not make the stronger state vulnerable.  Therefore, the burden falls 
on the weaker state to reassure first.  If the stronger state communicates its willingness to 
 
28 Charles Glasier, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy,” World Politics 44:4 (July 1992), 
522. 
29 Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold,” Foreign Affairs 80:3 (May–June 2001), 68.  
Obtained from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20050151 12 March 2009. 
30 Deborah Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in 
Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1986), 69.   
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cooperate, but requires a sign of reassurance, then it is up to the weaker state to begin the 
process.  Relative strength as the initiator will be an independent variable examined in 
this thesis.   
Transparency of intentions is another independent variable tested in this thesis.  
One way that transparency can be demonstrated is through participation in confidence 
building measures (CBMs).  CBMs are “often described as the fastest growing business 
of the post Cold War Era.”33  They are bilateral or multilateral activities that allow states 
to demonstrate their intentions and expose their capabilities.  Such activities reduce 
uncertainty and build trust, which increases the likelihood of reciprocation.  Desjardins 
explains that although CBMs are seen as “harmless and risk-free,” they are not “cost free 
or necessarily easy.”34   
CBMs, it is argued, can reduce the risk of miscalculation or 
communication failure escalating into war, and can inhibit the use, or the 
threat of use, of force for political coercion.  They can increase 
predictability, strengthen stability, and enhance security. . .35 
Another variable to consider is multilateralism.  Jervis argues that concerts, or 
multilateral regimes, may reduce the possibility of defection because “the state will have 
to expect that its defection will meet opposition not only from the particular state it is 
harming, but also from others in the old coalition.”36  Furthermore, multilateral regimes 
allow for the establishment of norms for cooperation that its members can rely on.  As 
Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane point out, “international regimes do not substitute 
for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it.  Regimes incorporating the 
norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly.”37  Finally, 
multilateralism leads to a higher level of communication among the actors, joint 
 
33 Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to Agreement and 
the Risks of Overselling the Process, ADELPHI Paper #307Oxford:  Oxford University press, 1996), 4. 
34 Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, 63 
35 Ibid., 4–5. 
36 Ibid., 70. 
37 Robert Axelrod, and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 250. 
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declarations of common goals, cultural and military exchanges, and transparency—all 
factors that increase the likelihood for cooperation.38    
On the issue of trust, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler describe four pairs of 
attributes (called properties of trust) that are integral to reciprocity and cooperation.39  
The first property is “leap in the dark/uncertainty.”  Under this property, one state 
initiates the trust-building process by sending a signal of reassurance towards the other 
state without knowing the outcome.40  A second pair is “empathy/bonding.”  Social 
scientist L.G. Wispe defines empathy as the “self-conscious effort to share and accurately 
comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including his thoughts, 
feelings…[and] perceptions…as well as their causes.”41 Under this pair, states that seek 
to build trust must understand each other’s interests.  Although they may disagree on the 
motivations for the interests, both states should understand the other’s motivations and 
seek to accommodate these interests as best as possible.   
The third property of the trust-building model is “dependence/vulnerability.”  
Under this pair, “actors must be willing to accept their vulnerability to betrayal if their 
positive expectations about the motives and intentions of others prove misplaced.”42 Both 
trust and vulnerability increase when a state gives up something of value.43 In other 
words, “the acceptance of vulnerability is an essential property of trust.”44  Booth and 
Wheeler’s final property of trust is integrity/reliability.  This pair centers on the 
implication that “partners have confidence that the other will do what is right.”45  
Proving one state’s reliability takes tim
 
38 Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in 
Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1986), 73. 
39 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma:  Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics, 234. 
40 Ibid. 
41Ibid., 234.  The definition is cited from L.G. Wispe, “Sympathy and Empathy,” The International 
Encyclopedia of Social Science, 15 (1968):  441–446. 
42 Ibid., 241. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. This quote is cited from Hollis, M., Trust Within Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).  
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Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a 
lifetime of common experiences and through sustained interactions and 
reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification 
offered by organizations, trial and error, and a historical legacy of actions 
and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude notwithstanding 
the uncertainty that accompanies social life.46 
This resembles Axelrod’s “shadow of the future” argument:   
If one side takes the initiative and adopts a ‘nice’ strategy and both sides 
follow a rule of reciprocity, cooperation can evolve through a tit-for-tat 
mechanism.  The main condition is that the two sides anticipate interacting 
many more times, so that the ‘shadow of the future’ is cast over present 
actions.47 
Janice Stein’s work on reassurance focuses on the benefits of reassurance over 
deterrence.  She offers five reassurance strategies “that differ in the scope of their 
objectives and in their combinations of the elements of reassurance.”48  Her first strategy 
is restraint.  Stein argues that a state’s restraint inspires trust that can usher in a period of 
reassurance signals.  The problem with restraint is that an adversary may misperceive 
restraint as a demonstration of weakness, and exploit the situation.  Stein’s second 
strategy is “reassurance through norms of competition.”49  Adversaries can agree to 
compete under certain rules.  An adherence to rules deescalates tensions because it 
increases the predictability of state behavior.  Stein’s third strategy is “reassurance 
through irrevocable commitment.”50 In this strategy, a state can reassure by taking a 
significant gesture or action that it cannot undo.  Her fourth strategy is “reassurance 
through limited security regimes.”51  These regimes increase transparency, establish 
norms, and allow for confidence building.  The fifth strategy is “reassurance through 
 
46 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma:  Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics, 243–244.  This quote is cited from Barnet, M. and E Adler, “Studying Security Communities in 
Theory, Comparison, and History,” in E. Adler and M. Barnett (ed), Security Communities (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press), 413–442. 
47 Matthew Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy,” in Behavior, Society, and 
Nuclear War, ed. Tetlock, Philip, et al. ( Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1991), 262. 
48 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 32. 
49 Ibid., 38. 
50 Ibid., 42. 
51 Ibid., 45. 
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reciprocity.”  Stein writes “when the issue is one of security, reciprocal behavior is most 
usefully conceived as a pattern of contingent, sequential, and diffuse exchange among 
independent adversaries.”52   This last strategy goes to the heart of this thesis.  
The limited literature on reassurance suggests several conditions that tend to 
improve the odds of cooperation when a state offers a signal of reassurance.  Osgood’s 
“spiral of hope” theory is about states that decide to embark on a trust-building process 
that involves signals of reassurance, reciprocation, and cooperation.  History has included 
cases where these processes have succeeded and others where they have not.  With the 
stakes in the international system so high, it behooves all actors to consider these 
conditions and pursue them as frequently as possible.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Based on the literature review, this thesis consolidates the different factors that 
improve the chances of a successful reassurance exchange. In particular, four conditions 
(independent variables) will be tested to see if they played any part on a reassuree’s 
decision to reciprocate an initial signal of reassurance (dependent variable).   
1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and 
the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to 
cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility 
cycle.”53  It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, 
that it wants to cooperate as well.  Once it does, the chances that the stronger 
state will reciprocate are high. 
2. Reassurance signals applied within a multilateral framework increase the 
chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime may 
encourage reciprocation. 
3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its defensive intentions through 
political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance 
is more likely to be reciprocated. 
 
52Janice G Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 52.  Stein cites Larson, D.W., “Game Theory and the 
Psychology of Reciprocity.”  Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington DC. 
53Term “arms-hostility cycle” is from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Relations (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1976), 82.  This term will be used throughout this thesis. 
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4. A reassurance signal is most likely to be reciprocated when the signal is 
perceived as costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s 
signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate. 
The methodology for this project will employ the comparative case study 
approach, focusing on four case studies from recent history where a signal of reassurance 
by one of the two adversaries sought to break a spiral of tensions and replace it with a 
“spiral of hope.”  In two of these, the initial signal of reassurance was reciprocated, 
leading to rapprochement; in the other two, the initial signal was not reciprocated and 
tensions continued.  This thesis seeks to identify which of the four conditions identified 
above were evident in the cases where reassurance led to rapprochement, and if any of 
these conditions were evident in the cases where reassurance failed to improve relations.  
Since there could be other explanations for the two cases of rapprochement, each case 
study will consider the most plausible competing explanation for the rapprochement, and 
will compare the competing explanation with the reassurance explanation.   
The first case involves the rapprochement between Spain and Morocco.  Both 
nations almost went to war in 2002 when Moroccan troops occupied a small island off its 
coast in the Strait of Gibraltar, claimed by Spain.  Today, relations between the two 
neighbors are arguably at their best level ever.  This case study highlights evidence of a 
reassurance exchange that may have led to rapprochement, and seeks to find if any of the 
above conditions were present. 
The second case involves the rapprochement between Italy and Libya.  Both 
nations almost went to war in 1986 when Libya launched two Scud missiles at a U.S. 
base in Italy in retaliation for an American air strike on Libya several hours earlier.  Italy 
chose not to retaliate.  Today, as in the first case, relations between the two neighbors are 
arguably at their best level ever.  This case study also highlights evidence of a 
reassurance exchange that ushered in a new “spiral of hope.”   
The third case study focuses on the dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua 
over an archipelago in the Western Caribbean.  This dispute has led to military shows of 
force and almost war.  Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arbitrated the 
dispute, tensions have remained high.  The tensions have spilled over into the war 
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between Colombia and domestic armed guerrilla groups that seek to overthrow the 
Colombian Government.  Nicaragua has openly supported these groups, causing more 
mistrust among Colombian policymakers.  Nicaragua attempted to break the spiral of fear 
by sending a signal of reassurance to Colombia; however, Colombia did not reciprocate, 
essentially ending a first attempt at a reassurance exchange. 
The fourth case study has to do with the ongoing tensions between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots.  After several conflicts that included Greek and Turkish forces, a tense 
but stable situation has existed for over thirty years.  In two particular occasions, the 
Greek Cypriot Government sent signals of reassurance to the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC).  The TRNC did not perceive these signals as reassurance and 
did not reciprocate. This case study focuses on the causes of the failure of reassurance .  
This thesis will employ the “controlled comparison” format.  All four cases will 
point out and explain the pertinent signals of reassurance.  The four conditions constitute 
the independent variables.  The reciprocation or not of the reassurance signals constitutes 
the dependent variable.  The presence or absence of the conditions will be demonstrated 
through logical arguments based on empirical data (events and facts). 
The primary sources for this thesis include press releases, political speeches, and 
treaties.  Secondary sources include academic research regarding reassurance from 
scholarly journals, books, and dissertations, as well as newspaper articles, magazines, 
etc., that provide information about events. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Under what conditions is a signal of reassurance reciprocated?  The first step in 
answering this question is defining the term “reassurance.”  Chapter II will bring the 
concept out of the traditional Cold War scope explained in the literature review, and into 
the twenty-first century.  Then, the next four chapters will be the four case studies that 
will test the proposed conditions.  Before summarizing the findings of the case studies, 
Chapter VII will bring the concept back into perspective, using two historical cases, and 
two from present times where these findings can help a policymaker decide whether or 
not reassurance may be a good influence strategy to pursue.  
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Each case study will have five sections.  First, a historical overview of each case 
study will explain the evolution of the tensions.  Second, the securitized issues of both 
states will be outlined.  Next, in the cases where relations improved, a competing 
explanation—not having to do with reassurance—will offer an alternate explanation for 
the reduced tensions.  Next, an explanation of the signals of reassurance and their effects 
will point to the eventual outcome of the relationship.  Next, the presence or absence of 
the four proposed conditions will be explained with regard to each case.  It is important to 
note that in the case of reduced tensions, alternative explanations may complement—
rather than compete with—the progress that can be attributed to reassurance. 
The findings of this thesis will reveal that reassurance can succeed in reducing 
tensions.  This thesis will conclude that out of the four conditions that increase the 
possibility of reciprocation, a transparency of intentions is consistently present in the two 
successful cases, and not present in two unsuccessful cases.  The next finding most 
consistent with the cases is that a signal perceived as costly by the reassuree has a high 
potential of being reciprocated.  Similarly consistent is the condition that, when the 
weaker state reassures first, the stronger state is most likely to reciprocate.  Finally, the 
thesis will conclude that multilateralism has a meaningless effect on the potential of 
reassurance.  
 16
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II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REASSURANCE:  ADAPTING 
AN INFLUENCE STRATEGY TO THE NEW CONCEPT OF 
SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The unexpected end of the Cold War taught international relations (IR) scholars 
that influence strategies do not always have to involve hostile military postures.  The 
world was able to step back from the brink of nuclear war on a number of occasions and 
defuse nuclear tensions through generally peaceful means.  World leaders learned that 
understanding an adversary’s most important interests can reduce tensions.  In this new 
post-Cold War era, a modernization of security studies requires an equal modernization 
of influence strategies.  No longer should these be limited to diplomatic and military 
actions.  Influence strategies should involve issues that states prioritize, or securitize.   
The evolution of security studies has required all influence strategies to be 
reexamined through a post-Cold War lens.54  Considering the literature review in Chapter 
I, most scholarship regards reassurance as involving means such as arms reduction 
pledges, troop redeployments, and diplomatic gestures.  These actions are designed to 
convince the other side that a state does not intend to threaten the other side’s security.  
This chapter proposes that successful reassurance strategies should not be restricted to the 
“military sector” of international relations.  As security studies expand to include the 
political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, so too should reassurance 
strategies.55  States can successfully reassure their adversaries by sending signals that 
improve the condition of any issue that an adversary has securitized—or made vitally 
important to its existence. 
This chapter first groups the literature on the subject reviewed in Chapter I into 
two main “schools of thought” prevalent in the traditional concept of reassurance.  Then 
 
54 The definition that reassurance is the process of building trust comes from Andrew Kydd, Trust and 
Mistrust in International Relations, 184. 
55 These sectors are defined and explained in Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers inc., 1998). 
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it will explain the recent evolution of security studies, and propose that reassurance adapt 
to this evolution.  Next, it will distinguish this updated concept of reassurance (in this 
thesis referred to as “twenty-first century reassurance”) from other more established IR 
influence strategies.  Finally, an overview of securitized issues in four case studies will 
ground the broad conceptualization of reassurance being proposed here. 
B. REASSURANCE:  FROM THE CONVENTIONAL TO THE POST-
MODERN 
There are two main “schools of thought” with regard to reassurance.  The first, 
originally proposed by Charles Osgood, explains the merits of reassurance from a 
psychological angle.  The second school, proposed by Robert Jervis, explains the merits 
of reassurance from a rational angle.56   Recent advocates of reassurance include Andrew 
Kydd and Janice G. Stein.  Kydd supports Jervis’ “rational choice approach” by 
proposing that the effectiveness of a reassurance signal depends on how costly it is.  Stein 
supports Osgood’s psychological approach by arguing that reassurance is an alternative 
to deterrence that can achieve “less conflictual relationships” through conventional and 
non-conventional methods.57  Stein’s work brings the concept of reassurance out of the 
dusty annals of Cold War history and into the twenty-first century.  This project seeks to 
continue in this direction.  
Charles Osgood begins his argument by critiquing man’s “Neanderthal 
mentality.”  “Since the Neanderthal in us naively assumes that everyone shares his 
norms, it must follow that if someone else sees as ‘straight’  what to him is obviously 
crooked, calls ‘tasty’ what to him is obviously distasteful, then this other person must be 
dishonest, evil, or at least abnormal in some way.”58  He argues that the Neanderthal 
mentality forces one state to identify with everything it likes (in the case of the United 
States, freedom and democracy), while identifying an enemy with everything it dislikes 
(in the case of the USSR, communism, tyranny, autocracy).  Considering this mentality, 
 
56 Both “schools of thought” are explained in Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 
328, 329. 
57 Janice G. Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 30–33. 
58 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, 25. 
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two adversaries will start from a position of mistrust, and will assume that any signal 
received is aggressive and threatening, while any signal sent is defensive and correct.  
Osgood offers the 1960 shoot down of an American U2 overflying the Soviet Union as an 
illustration of the Neanderthal mentality.   
Witness the debate in the United Nations over the U2 incident:  
Americans, knowing themselves to be peaceful in intent but being afraid 
of treacherous surprise attack, viewed this as a legitimate defense 
operation; Russians, knowing themselves to be peace-loving, not 
treacherous, but suspecting treacherous espionage from us, viewed this as 
a confirmation of their fears.59 
Mistrust forces a state to reciprocate an aggressive signal with another aggressive 
signal, and so on.  A “spiral of terror” develops whereby a state assumes that its 
adversary’s signals are evil and deserving of equal, tension-increasing “defensive” 
signals that the adversary then also interprets as evil.  Osgood proposes that this spiral 
can be broken if one of the adversaries sends a “peace offensive.”  The signal has to be 
positive enough to overcome the adversary’s Neanderthal mentality.  If the adversary is 
convinced that the signal is positive, it will reciprocate, initiating a “spiral of hope” that 
can lead to a reduction in tensions.  As a way to initiate this spiral of hope, Osgood 
proposed the Gradual Reduction In Tensions (GRIT) strategy. It involves a “self-
regulating procedure in which the participants carefully monitor their own initiatives on 
the basis of their own evaluation of the reciprocating actions taken by the other side.”60   
As early as 1962, Osgood suggested that “[GRIT] is broader than disarmament, or 
even disengagement, as this is usually conceived, since it would include programs of 
graded initiatives of a tension-reducing nature in areas of science and secrecy, of 
economic, social, and cultural exchanges, of Communist China and the United Nations, 
of controls and inspections, of diplomatic adjustments, and so forth—as well as actual 
military and disarmament steps.”61  Today, Stein argues that “insofar as leaders can 
modify their [reassurance] strategies to accommodate the political, strategic, cultural, and 
 
59 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, 29. 
60 Ibid., 88. 
61 Ibid. 
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psychological context of their adversary, reciprocal strategies of tension reduction may be 
useful in changing the context of an adversarial relationship.”62   
In contrast to the psychological emphasis of Osgood and Stein, Robert Jervis 
explains reassurance through a rational model of behavior. State behavior is oftentimes 
influenced by uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions.  Jervis agrees that psychology 
creates unnecessary spirals of fear, but he departs from Osgood by arguing that “some 
[rational] policies aimed at security will [inevitably] threaten others.”63  One of his 
examples is the fact that Canada’s only war plan in 1920 envisioned the defense of the 
homeland against an American invasion.64  Although the notion of an American invasion 
in Canada seems far-fetched today, a Canadian policymaker in 1920 could have cited the 
historical fact that the United States invaded lands held by Mexico and Spain between 
1848 and 1898, and come to a rational conclusion that Canada’s greatest threat in 1920 
was from its Southern neighbor.    
Jervis also explains that powerful states routinely require a high sense of security 
and manifest that requirement through postures that are misperceived as threatening by 
other states.  This describes the environment throughout the Cold War.  Both the Soviet 
Union and the United States crafted their security policies assuming an ever-present 
existential threat from each other.  Jervis argues that these perceptions of threat force two 
counterparts into a spiral where fear fuels unnecessary armaments and hostility.  
Unless the requirements for offense and defense differ in kind or amount, 
a status quo power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an 
aggressor. For this reason, others cannot infer from its military forces and 
preparations whether the state is aggressive. States therefore tend to 





62 Janice G. Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 56. 
63 Jervis makes the assertion that “spiral theorists… have given a psychological explanation for 
perceptions of threat without adequate discussion of whether these perceptions are warranted.” – Robert 
Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1976), 76. 
64 These examples, as well as Jervis’ description of the Spiral Model, can be found in Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 62–67. 
 21
                                                
can afford. But since both sides obey the same imperatives,   an attempt to 
increase one’s security by standing firm and accumulating more arms is 
self-defeating. 65 
The enormous expenditures on nuclear weapons by the United States and the 
Soviet Union throughout the Cold War are an example of how this spiral model can lead 
adversaries to a self defeating position, since the excessive production of nuclear 
weapons did not make either side more secure.  Jervis argues that states can break this 
spiral if they can determine each other’s defensive posture through reassurance. 
When two countries are locked in a spiral of arms and hostility, such 
bonds [of shared values and interests] are obviously hard to establish.  The 
first step must be a realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, 
that they are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires.  
On the basis of this understanding, one must take the initiative that 
increases the other side’s security… The end result is not that the state has 
given something up, or even that it has proposed a trade, but that a step is 
taken towards a mutually beneficial relationship. 66 
According to Jervis, one state can correct a misperception (rather than a 
impression based on the Neanderthal Mentality) by convincing its adversary that it is not 
an aggressor.  A signal of reassurance may be appropriate when “the adversary’s 
motivation for possibly taking a hostile action is defensive and stems from a sense of 
weakness, vulnerability, or mistaken concern that hostile actions are about to be directed 
towards it.”67  But misperceptions can go the other way.  “Aggressors often think that 
their intentions are obvious to others and therefore conclude that any concessions made to 
them must be the result of fear and weakness.”68  The key to reassurance depends on a 
state’s accurate understanding of an adversary’s intentions.  A defensive posture deserves 
reassurance; an offensive posture deserves deterrence.    
 
 
65 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 64–65. 
66 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 82.  
67 Alexander George, “The Need for Influence Theory and the Actor-Specific Models of Adversaries,” 
Comparative Strategy, 22 (December 2003), 466. 
68 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 85. 
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The application of these schools of thought to today’s “broadening and 
deepening” of security issues reveals that reassurance can be applied in disputes that are 
not primarily military in nature, but that involve issues that a state has securitized, or 
made vital to its existence.  Recent research in security studies suggests that states may 
value some of their securitized issues as much as their military issues, and may hence be 
“reassurable” in a dimension other than military. But what is the new concept of security?  
A careful explanation will uncover the potential of twenty-first century reassurance. 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY STUDIES 
Given the level of anarchy in the international system, security has always been 
one of the highest priorities for governments.  However, what is international security?  
According to Amitav Acharya, security has traditionally meant “protection of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military threats.”69  If an 
adversary’s military posture presents an existential threat to the survival of a state, 
government, territory, or society, then that adversary’s actions have been interpreted as 
threats to security.70  A leader or government that perceives a threat to any of these 
“referent objects” can justify extreme actions to defend against that threat.  Buzan et al. 
label this “securitization,” a situation that can arise whenever “…a state representative 
declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block a threatening development.”71 These actions can include curtailing 
civil rights, mobilizing the military, and spending large amounts of money.   
Since the end of Word War II, many states have successfully used this mechanism 
for dealing with threats in issue areas that are not traditionally associated with security.  
For example, the United States successfully securitized its accessibility to the world’s 
supply of oil in the 1970s, and used this issue as a justification for military and economic 
actions against Iraq in 1991–1992.  Iraq threatened this securitized issue because there 
was a perceived threat that it would negatively impact U.S. accessibility to oil if it 
 
69 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security,” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, eds.  The 
Globalization of World Politics, (New York:  Oxford University Press 1996), 492. 
70 Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21. 
71 Ibid. 
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invaded its oil-rich neighbors.72  Hyperinflation was successfully securitized in Latin 
America in the 1970s, as military regimes overthrew civilian governments, claiming the 
right to intervene to stabilize inflation.  In addition to cases involving action by the 
military to defeat non-military threats, security studies has brought attention to the 
strategies using non-military responses to non-military threats in the name of security.   
The key to securitization is that a state “takes politics beyond the established rules 
of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics... 
[in other words] securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of 
politization.”73  A state that politicizes an issue usually subjects it to lengthy public 
debates.  In a democracy, a majority—but not all—of the political players have to agree 
on a politicized decision.  In contrast, a state securitizes when all players, including those 
of the opposition, agree that the issue poses an existential threat to the state and 
essentially relinquish power to the executive so that he or she can use emergency 
measures to deal with the issue.  The feeling becomes, “[if] the problem is not handled 
now it will be too late, and we will not exist [or be able] to remedy our failure.”74  In 
autocracies, it is easier to securitize an issue because the opposition’s agreement is not 
required and the executive can deal with the issue though extraordinary means.   
Considering how states can effectively securitize any current issue, security is no 
longer restricted to the physical survival of the state from the military threat of an 
adversary.  It has broadened to include threats to human survival and can include non-
military solutions that safeguard society on a transnational level.  For example, what 
good is the survival of The Maldives as a state if climate change will potentially cause the 
Indian Ocean to wipe the islands off the map?  What good is the state survival of 
Argentina if it has no credible currency or economy?  If a state’s main role is the security 
of its citizens, then it must securitize issues that threaten human survival.  If an adversary 
threatens a securitized issue, then tensions can arise that can lead to military action, but 
can also be resolved with non-military alternatives.   
 
72 Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 24, 26. 
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Considering the dynamic of “broadening and deepening” of security, Buzan et al. 
grouped “securitizable” issues into five types, or “sectors”: military, political, economic, 
societal, and environmental.  The concept of associating economic, societal, and 
environmental issues to security is new, and indeed necessary in today’s international 
system characterized by interdependence, supranationalism, and globalization.  It is only 
fitting that IR influence strategies adapt to this expansion of the concept of security.    
D. SECURITY STUDIES AND REASSURANCE CONVERGE 
Twenty-first century reassurance originates from the application of the traditional 
concept of reassurance strategy to a broader and deeper concept of security.  Helga 
Haftendorn explains that while the traditional concept of security continues to apply to 
the “highly industrialized democracies of the west… other countries have very different 
concepts of security.  Most developing countries emphasize the economic, social, and 
domestic dimensions of security.”75  With this in mind, Buzan proposes that security 
involve “a much more open spectrum of possibilities” than the traditional survival of the 
state concept.76  Likewise, reassurance should involve a wide spectrum of possibilities.  
If an adversary understands why a state has securitized an issue, and desires to reduce 
tensions, then it can send a signal of reassurance by using its power to improve the 
situation with respect to that securitized issue.  Unfortunately, the nature of international 
anarchy and the lack of credibility among adversaries have typically allowed the 
“Neanderthal mentality” to prevail.  It has been more likely for a state to distrust its 
adversary’s reasons for securitizing an issue, and miss an opportunity for reassurance.   
Twenty-first century reassurance seeks to remedy this tendency by examining an 
adversary’s strategic culture, rational interests, psychological motivations, domestic 
 
75 Helga Haftendorm,  “The Security Puzzle:  Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in 
International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (March 1991), 5. 
76 Barry Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 36. 
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politics, and credibility.77  Each of these elements influences an adversary’s decision to 
securitize an issue.  Determining credibility presents the greatest obstacle to reassurance 
Unlike deterrence, where the burden of determining credibility falls solely on the 
threatened state (assuming the deterrer intends to deter), reassurance involves a 
determination of credibility by the reassurer (is it worth sending a signal of reassurance in 
the first place?) and the reassuree (does the reassurer have defensive intentions that merit 
reciprocation?).  This is why understanding predictive mentalities can help both the 
reassurer and reassuree in this rather daunting “dual burden” of credibility in reassurance. 
This thesis seeks to open a debate on whether reassurance signals towards 
securitized (or highly politicized) issues can reduce tensions.  The uncertainty remains: 
will the reassuree react positively to the reassurer’s empathy?  Or, will the reassuree 
dismiss the signal as not costly enough, given that the signal may pertain to an issue that 
is not as vital to the reassurer?  Those who advocate a psychological approach to 
reassurance would argue that psychological factors determine a state’s reaction to a signal 
of reassurance.  Those who advocate a “rational choice approach” to reassurance would 
argue that since it is difficult to determine if a non-military signal is costly enough to 
reciprocate, reassurance is most effective in military and diplomatic issues.78  This may 
explain why reassurance’s strongest advocates—Osgood and Stein—stand in the 
psychological strand, while those who try to confine reassurance to military issues—
Jervis and Kydd—stand in the rational choice approach strand.   
In a paper titled “The Psychology of Assurance,” Stein mentions that “scholars in 
international relations are now beginning to look carefully at the neuroscience of emotion 
and how it affects cooperation, war termination, the credibility of threats, financial 
decision making, and the solution of collective action problems.”79 These elements are 
 
77 Janice G. Stein, “The Psychology of Assurance:  An Emotional Tale,” Paper prepared for 
Conference on Security Assurances in the Summer of 2009, 12–13.  Stein argues that the potential of 
assurances may depend on these factors.  This thesis goes further, suggesting that understanding these 
factors in an adversary can also help a reassurer understand what its adversary has securitized, allowing the 
reassurer to target its signal.  A state is best served when it reassures “smartly,” and not “blindly.” 
78 The term “rational choice,” as it pertains to reassurance, is advocated by Andre Kydd in his book 
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, (Princeton:  Princeton University press, 2005), 185. 
79 Janice G. Stein, “The Psychology of Assurance:  An Emotional Tale,” 10. 
 26
                                                
useful in understanding the potential of twenty-first century reassurance.  If a state 
empathizes with an adversary by promoting an adversary’s securitized issue, then there is 
a psychological expectation that empathy will invoke positive reactions.  However, 
empathy can also invoke suspicion.  This is why a policymaker needs to consider the 
psychological clues behind state behavior.  Richard Ned Lebow writes, “While it is 
difficult to penetrate the cultural and political barriers that impede empathy, it is 
nevertheless essential for policymakers to attempt to understand the goals and schemas of 
their adversaries before using strategies of either coercion or reward.”80   
E. DISTINGUISHING MODERN REASSURANCE FROM OTHER 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND INFLUENCE STRATEGIES 
Twenty-first century reassurance is not deterrence, though one strategy may 
complement the other.  Deterrence has received much more attention than reassurance; so 
much so, that the “assurance” dimension of deterrence has been confused with 
reassurance.  Nevertheless, most post-Cold War scholars of deterrence distinguish it from 
reassurance: 
Strategies of reassurance begin with a different set of assumptions. Unlike 
deterrence, they root the source of overt, aggressive behaviour in the acute 
vulnerability of adversaries. Reassurance encourages self-defined 
defenders to search for effective ways of communicating their benign and 
defensive intentions to would-be challengers. They do so to reduce the 
fear, misunderstanding and insecurity that are so often responsible for 
conflict escalation. The combination of carrots and sticks is often more 
successful than either alone.81 
Twenty-first century reassurance can be used in conjunction with deterrence.  But 
deterrence need not include reassurance, and reassurance need not include deterrence.  A 
policymaker that decides to employ the “team” of reassurance and deterrence should 
consider that reassurance requires two defenders; deterrence requires at least one 
aggressor. If a perceived aggressor is actually a defender, then it can reveal its defensive 
intentions by sending a signal of reassurance.  If a defensive state is transparent in its 
 
80 Richard Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War,” Global Dialogue 
(Autumn 2001), 130. 
81 Ibid., 128. 
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intentions, then reassurance is also preferred.  If an offensive state is transparent in its 
intentions (and does not hide its aggressive intentions), then deterrence is the better 
choice.  If a defensive state is not transparent, then initial deterrence can bring about 
transparency and improve the conditions for reassurance.   This logic assumes that the 
deterring (or reassuring) state is also demonstrating a transparent posture.  Because of the 
“dual burden” of reassurance, transparency becomes a key variable when assessing the 
potential of a successful reassurance exchange.82   
Another important difference between deterrence and reassurance involves the 
status quo.  While deterrence strategy assumes that one state wants its adversary to 
refrain from altering the status quo, reassurance assumes that both states are willing to 
live in a status quo, but tensions remain that preclude cooperation and relations.83 
Deterrence has been recently updated to reflect a “fourth wave” that reflects the 
realities of a post-9/11 world.  This “twenty-first century deterrence” also emphasizes the 
need to understand adversaries’ securitized issues.  The fact that deterrence is getting an 
update only strengthens the call for a similar “second wave” update for reassurance.84 
Twenty-first century reassurance is not compellence, though many classify 
reassurance as one of the tenets of a broader concept of compellence.  As in the case of 
deterrence, some who study compellence have included “positive inducements” into the 
strategy.  In his book The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Robert F.  Art 
mentions that “coercive diplomacy can include, but need not include, positive 
inducements, and these inducements can involve either a transfer of resources to the 
 
82 This logic is similar to Stein’s logic: “if an adversary is driven by domestic political needs or 
strategic weakness, then reassurance may be more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence.  If adversarial 
motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence.  When an adversary 
is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is 
designed to prevent.”  The main difference between Stein’s logic and the logic offered here is that this logic 
focuses on transparency; Stein’s focuses on needs and opportunity. All three variables are important 
considerations.  Stein’s logic is found in Janice G. Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. 
Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear war, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1991), 59. 
83 An empirical example for the first scenario is the tension between the United States and Iran, where 
the U.S.is trying to deter Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  An empirical example of the second 
scenario is the tension between the United States and Venezuela, where cooperation is unlikely but neither 
state is actively trying to deter the other from doing something. 
84 Jeffrey Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy (2010).   
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target or the offer of things…[that] are nonetheless of tangible benefits to the target.”85  
But in the foreword of this same book, George suggests the distinct nature of what he 
calls “positive incentives.” 
Earlier research on coercive diplomacy had already focused on the 
importance of adding meaningful positive incentives in a combined ‘carrot 
and stick’ variant of the strategy. . .in general, positive inducements 
should not be offered before undertaking coercive threats or limited 
military action.86 
The main difference between positive inducements included in a strategy of 
compellence and reassurance is the degree of urgency in each strategy.  Compellence 
involves alternating positive inducements with force to change someone’s behavior 
rapidly.  Twenty-first century reassurance does not involve force.  Rather, the strategy 
seeks a gradual change of behavior over a long period of time, as adversaries develop 
trust towards each other.  The change in behavior is more an aspiration than a time-urgent 
necessity, and there are no guarantees or expectations of a timely reciprocation.  When 
reassurance is applied, the reassurer is not comfortable with the status quo, but is willing 
to live with it.  When compellence is applied, the status quo is being altered, and the 
coercer is trying to force the coercee to return to it urgently.  Positive incentives in both 
strategies can be useful, but serve different purposes and involve different environments 
and timelines. 
Twenty-first century reassurance differs from positive incentives in that positive 
incentives mirror compellence strategy by attaching strings to those incentives.  There is 
usually a linkage, or condition, that that the receiver will give something back or do 
something in return for a positive incentive.  Although peace is a general goal, positive 
incentives seek a specific “quid pro quo.”  They do not necessarily require a warming of 
relations, but rather a specific change of behavior in a specific place in time.87  On the 
other hand, reassurance signals do not have “strings attached.”  There is an undertone of 
 
85 Robert Art, “Introduction,” in Robert Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive 
Diplomacy, (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace Studies, 2003), 7. 
86 Alexander George, “Foreword” in Art, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,” x. 
87 Miroslav Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Engagement:  Dealing with Renegade Regimes,” 
International Studies Perspectives 7 (November 2006), 326.  
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hope that the adversary reciprocates with a similar signal of reassurance that applies to a 
securitized issue (thus, the term “spiral of hope” coined by Osgood). This hope includes a 
broader rapprochement through trust. It is more open-ended, and without an immediate 
expectation of a change in behavior.  Deborah Larson uses an example from the Cold 
War to explain how post-Stalin Soviet leaders sent signals of reassurance in an open-
ended attempt at rapprochement with the United States.  Initially, the signals did not 
change the status quo, and there is even evidence that the lack of an American 
reciprocation antagonized the Soviets.88  But over time, Larson argues that reassurance 
led to the crafting of the Austrian State Treaty.  Positive incentives in this case would 
have probably failed at the first lack of reciprocation. 
Twenty-first century reassurance does fall into a unique “blurry line” between 
conflict resolution and influence strategy.  Conflict resolution strategies seek to build 
confidence between adversaries undergoing a conflict.  This confidence can be attained 
through “formal and informal arrangements to which they can agree to hand over their 
conflict, whose solution they can accept and which can define the termination of a 
conflict.”89  The ultimate goal is “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in 
a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with—and/or dissolve—their basic 
incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another.”90  Although 
reassurance also seeks to build trust, it assumes that hostilities have not begun, or ended 
some time before. Conflict resolution is employed when there is a sense of urgency to 
terminate hostilities.  Reassurance seeks to keep tensions from escalating any further.  
Reassurance can follow conflict resolution if hostilities end and tensions remain high.    
F. A PREVIEW OF THE FOUR CASE STUDIES 
Each of the four case studies in this thesis involves pairs of adversaries that 
recently underwent tensions.  All eight states in the case studies have one or more issues 
that are securitized, and the reassuring states have sent signals pertaining to these issues. 
 
88 Miroslav Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Engagement:  dealing with Renegade Regimes,” 40–45.  
89 Peter Wallerstein, Understanding Conflict Resolution, (London:  SAGE Publications, 2007), 35.  
Wallerstein cites Coser, Gatlung, and Schelling in his explanation. 
90 Ibid., 47. 
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Each case study will explain the signals and whether or not they were reciprocated. It is 
worth reemphasizing that some issues that are highly politicized can function similarly to 
those that are securitized, and can be used as targets for signals of reassurance.  The state 
interests identified in each case study are gathered from the literature used to explain the 
evolution of tensions.  The determination of whether or not these interests are securitized 
or politicized is made by the author, in accordance with the definitions outlined above.  
To reemphasize, the main difference between securitized and politicized interests (or 
issues) is that securitized interests command a nearly unanimous sentiment of being a 
national priority by those in power, while politicized interests do not.  In other words, 
when almost all power actors in a state perceive that an interest involves an existential 
threat to the state, that interest is securitized.  On the other hand, the priority of 
politicized issues is subject to further debate.  Highly politicized issues, while not 
commanding a near unanimous sentiment of national priority, may still be perceived as 
critical by a majority of the power actors.   
In the case of Spain and Morocco, one of Spain’s securitized issues is illegal 
immigration from North Africa.  Most Spaniards are concerned that the massive influx of 
immigrants from Morocco will bankrupt its welfare funds, and will undermine the 
Spanish cultural identity.  Spain has also securitized the issue of sovereignty over the 
North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.  Spain also securitized terrorism in the 
aftermath of the 2004 Madrid train bombings.  Finally, Spain has highly politicized its 
fishing industry, making access to waters near Morocco a key part of Spain’s economic 
policy.  Morocco has securitized the issue of Western Sahara.  It considers this territory 
as part of Morocco, and considers any opposition to Western Sahara’s annexation a threat 
to its territorial integrity.  In addition, due to the massive poverty facing Morocco, the 
kingdom has securitized the access of its exports to European markets.   
In the case of Italy and Libya, Italy has also securitized immigration, declaring a 
state of emergency in 2008 in response to the massive influx of immigrants from Libya.  
In addition, international terrorism was securitized in 1986, when Libyan terrorists 
attacked Rome’s Airport.  The attacks terrorized the Italian people, causing the issue to 
be perceived as an existential threat.  Libya, an autocracy led by one individual, has 
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securitized its ability to sell its natural resources.  Any international economic sanction 
undermines Muammar Qhadafi’s grip on power, especially as Islamist opposition groups 
seek to capitalize on the country’s social conditions to topple the Libyan ruler.  Libya has 
also securitized the legacy of colonial atrocities.  Qhadafi insists that as long as these 
atrocities are not compensated, Libya’s survival as a state is threatened because the 
effects of colonialism impede Libyan cohesion and progress. 
In the case of Nicaragua and Colombia, Nicaragua has securitized the issue of 
sovereignty over the resource-rich waters on its Atlantic coast.  This fuels its claim to the 
San Andres archipelago, which has been a politicized interest (subject to significant 
political opposition).  Colombia has securitized the existence of guerrilla organizations 
that actively seek to take over the Colombian Government.  It has also securitized the San 
Andres archipelago, claiming that the island as an integral part of its territory.   
In the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have securitized the Turkish occupation 
and consider it an existential threat to the Republic of Cyprus.  Meanwhile, the Turkish 
Cypriots consider the lack of an internationally recognized Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) as a threat to the Turkish Cypriot community’s existence.  Both sides see 
the other’s influence as a threat to its own identity, well-being, and security.  While 
treaties and external powers may have averted an all-out war, neither side is satisfied with 
the current status quo.  
G. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has re-conceptualized the strategy of reassurance in a world where 
security no longer pertains exclusively to military threats.  As other conflict resolution 
and influence strategies are updated, so too should the concept of reassurance strategy.  
Signals to demonstrate a state’s benign intentions should be economic, political, 
environmental, or military in nature.  A reassurer must have the power in regard to its 
adversary’s securitized issue to send a meaningful signal that will successfully reassure 
the adversary.  A reassurer should understand its adversary’s securitized issues, so it can 
target its signal more accurately.  A signal that is “off target” may not be regarded as 
costly or empathetic, rendering it meaningless and unlikely to be reciprocated.   
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This chapter also pointed to the merits of using psychology to determine whether 
an adversary’s non-military securitized issues are worth reassuring in order to reduce 
tensions.  Much more study is needed in this field, as there is little conclusive evidence 
that a state’s empathy towards another’s securitized issues can lead to a reduction in 
tensions.  There is more study needed on how to effectively combine reassurance with 
other influence strategies, such as compellence and deterrence, and how the variable of 
time affects the option to combine these strategies.  Finally, more study is needed to find 
the limit of security.  What is the limit to “securitizable” issues?  Any conclusions 
reached in the field of security studies need to be applied to reassurance. 
Finally, the suggestion, that “American policymakers need to worry less about 
communicating resolve and more about understanding the needs, goals, and subjective 
understandings of the leaders they want to deter, compel, or reward,”91 adds to the value 
of twenty-first century reassurance.  If our adversaries understand what we want, then 
they may be willing to reassure us in an issue that we have securitized.  The case studies 
in this thesis do not include the United States.  Nevertheless, they can aid a U.S. 
policymaker in understanding the potential of reassurance strategies, given the right 
conditions.   
 
91 Richard Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War.”  
III. CASE STUDY #1:  EXPLAINING THE RAPPROCHEMENT 
BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO 
Figure 1.   Spain-Morocco Area of Tensions (From: Nijmegen Center for Border 
Research, The Netherlands)92 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between Spain and Morocco showcases the ongoing challenges 
in the relationship between Europe and its Southern neighbors in North Africa.  The 
contrasts in culture, language, religion, and politics have created friction between the two 
regions.  Massive immigration from North Africa to Europe, European security concerns, 
and issues regarding energy have provided Europe a strong incentive to seek better 
relations with North Africa (commonly known as the Maghreb).  In 2002, Morocco and 
Spain experienced a dramatic spike in tensions, culminating in a confrontation over the 
small island of Perejil that put the two countries at the brink of war.  The EU reacted by 
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92 This map, relevant to the case study, is obtained from 
http://www.eudimensions.eu/content/pstudy/spanish_moroccan.htm on 20 January 2010. 
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supporting Spain, though there was internal disagreement on the degree of support.93  By 
the end of 2002, relations between the two neighbors were virtually nonexistent. 
Since 2002, Spain-Morocco relations have been repaired and are arguably at their 
best since Morocco’s decolonization in 1956.  What events caused Spain and 
Moroccotwo nations at the brink of war in 2002to have such close relations today?  
What event broke the “spiral of fear” and forged a “spiral of hope?”94  A signal of 
reassurance by Morocco, combined with Spain’s willingness to cooperate, halted the 
escalating tensions and beginning a period of rapprochement.  This case hence represents 
a success of reassurance.  This chapter argues that two of this thesis’ four conditions were 
present during the reassurance exchange.  A potential alternative explanation is that Spain 
sought rapprochement out of concern that continued tensions would benefit France at 
Spain’s expense, given the many economic and political incentives to cultivate influence 
in the Maghreb.  This chapter will conclude that this competing explanation accounts for 
part of the case outcome but not all of it.  Part of the trajectory from near conflict to 
friendly relations must be attributed to Morocco’s use of reassurance. 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
Spain’s relationship with Morocco is rooted in a history of colonialism and is 
affected by a rivalry between Spain and France over influence in North Africa.  The drive 
for European colonization in the 1800s brought France, Spain, the UK and Germany to 
Moroccan shores.  Morocco’s natural resources, strategic coastlines, and potential market 
for European goods made it a grand prize during the “scramble for Africa.”  The coastal 
city of Melilla had been a Spanish possession since 1497, five years after the end of the 
Reconquest.  Ceuta, another city on Morocco’s coast, had been a Portuguese port and 
remained under Spanish rule after the Iberian Union dissolved in 1640.95 
 
93 Dominique Petitt, “Morocco Makes Concessions to Spain over Island Dispute,” Agence France 
Presse, 19 July 2002.  Obtained from Lexis Nexis www.nexislexis.com on 3 February 2009). 
94 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, 6. 
 95 Olga Bel, “When Ceuta Voted for Spain,” The Independent, 17 July 1997, Leader section. 
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The 1884 Berlin Conference gave France the right to conquer North Africa while 
guaranteeing Spain the region of Western Sahara.96  France went on to claim most of 
Morocco in the 1890s.97  Between 1899 and 1904, European powers wrestled over their 
interests in Africa.98  A final settlement was concluded in the Spanish city of Algeciras in 
1906.99  Limited Moroccan sovereignty was overseen by a Spanish protectorate along 
Morocco’s North coast, and a French protectorate in Morocco’s interior.100  Although 
Moroccan nationalists challenged this arrangement, it withstood both World Wars and the 
Spanish Civil War.  In 1956, both protectorates (with the exception of Ceuta and Melilla) 
merged to form the Kingdom of Morocco.101   
Soon after independence, Morocco protested the Spanish presence in Ceuta, 
Melilla, and Western Sahara.  In 1975, as Spanish Ruler Francisco Franco lay on his 
death bed, King Hassan II of Morocco sent 350,000 unarmed Moroccans into Western 
Sahara and dared the Spanish troops to shoot at them.102  Spain’s leaders, cognizant of 
failed French campaigns in Algeria and Portugal’s failure to keep its colonies in Angola 
and Mozambique, ceded half of Western Sahara to Mauritania, and half to Morocco as a 
revolt became imminent.103  The ensuing war involved Moroccan troops in Western 
Sahara, in a conflict against the Saharan nationalist movement, the POLISARIO Front.104   
 
96 Stig Forster, Wolfganga Mommsen, and Ronald Robinson, Bismark, Europe, and Africa:  The 
Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition (London:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 
225.  
97 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa.  (New York:  Avon Books, 1991), 358–359. 
98 Mohamed Bouarfa,  Marruecos y Espana:  El Eterno Problema [Morocco and Spain:  The Eternal 
Problem].  (Malaga: Editorial Algazara, 2002), 49. France signed an accord with Italy vowing 
noninterference with Italian ventures in Libya.  Furthermore, it guaranteed Spain’s claim to Ceuta and 
Melilla, and ceded to Britain’s demands that Tangier be an international city and guaranteed the safe 
passage of British vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar.   
99 Ibid., 56–57. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 272. 
102 Jacob Mundy, “How the U.S.and Morocco Seized the Spanish Sahara,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 
January 2006.  Obtained from http://mondediplo.com/2006/01/12asahara on 18 September 2009. 
103 Ibid. 
104 The POLISARIO (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) is the pro-
independence movement for Western Sahara. 
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The Western Sahara issue has since fueled Moroccan nationalism.  It has provided 
a means for reconciliation between Hassan and national movements that had threatened 
his power with protests, two military coups, and the costly Sand War with Algeria.105    It 
also rallied Moroccans during the 2002 Crisis with Spain.  After a promising start in 
1997, Morocco’s democratic reforms initiated by Hassan and continued by his son 
Mohammed seemed to stall.106  The optimism that came from Prime Minister Abdul 
Rahman al-Yussufi’s election in 1997 eventually gave way to an impression of 
ineffectiveness in improving Morocco’s social problems, which helped the recruitment 
campaigns of illegal Islamic movements.107  As the 2002 parliamentary elections 
approached, Mohammed wanted to demonstrate to the world that Morocco was a 
showcase of free, democratic, and highly participatory elections.108  In order to do this, 
he needed a nationalist issue to rally Moroccans to the ballot box.  He borrowed a page 
from his father’s playbook and used the dispute over a small island in the Strait of 
Gibraltar to unite the Moroccan people. 
C. RECENT TENSIONS 
The crisis that led to the standoff over the island of Perejil began when both Spain 
and Morocco became fixated on their national interests and ceased to cooperate to 
achieve them.109  In April 2001, to Spain’s disappointment, Morocco suspended talks on 
fishery rights for Spanish ships, a politicized issue for Spain.  Interestingly, French 
President Jacques Chirac had said the previous year that he did not support Spanish 
fishery rights in Morocco.110  Many think that Mohammed suspended the talks due to 
 
105 Maria del Mar Holgado Molina, Relaciones Comerciales entre España y Marruecos, 1956–1996 
(Granada:  Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2001), 47. 
106 Paloma Gonzalez Del Miño, Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos [The Relations Between 
Spain and Morocco]. (Madrid:  Los Libros de la Catarata, 2005), 46–47. 
107 Maria del Mar Molina,  Relaciones Comerciales entre España y Marruecos, 1956–1996, 32. 
108 Paloma Gonzalez Del Miño, Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos, 49. 
109 Perejil is a small, uninhabited island on the Strait of Gibraltar off the coast of Morocco, near Ceuta.  
The name means “parsley” in Spanish.  Moroccans call the island by its Arabic name Leila. 
110 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados:  Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos”  
Neighbors Far Apart:  The Secrets of the Crisis Between Spain and Morocco] (Barcelona:  Circulo de 
Lectores, 2006), 50. 
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pressure from the Moroccan military, which was profiting from the fisheries.111  In 
retaliation, the Spanish foreign minister summoned the Moroccan ambassador in August 
to convey Spain’s concern at the increasing tide of illegal Moroccan immigration by way 
of makeshift boats (referring to one of Spain’s securitized issues).  Twelve days later, 
Mohammed blamed the Spanish Mafia for providing the boats for the illegal trafficking 
of immigrants.  In October, Morocco unilaterally postponed the planned December 
summit between Prime Minister Yussufi and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar 
and recalled its ambassador.112   
On 31 January 2002, Mohammed’s son Abdelkrim Jattabi declared that Spain 
should indemnify Moroccan victims of Spain’s gas attacks in the 1920s.113  Tensions 
heightened when Moroccan authorities expelled Canary Islands officials visiting Western 
Sahara on 1 June 2002.  On 6 July, the Moroccan foreign minister summoned the Spanish 
ambassador to protest the approach of five Spanish Marine ships to the Moroccan Coast 
(possibly in search of immigrant boats).  Morocco further responded by placing an 
observation post on Perejil on 11 July.114  Sovereignty over this island had never been 
clarified, although Spain considered it as part of its Ceuta enclave.  In the mind of 
Spanish leaders, Morocco’s act jeopardized the internationally recognized status quo.   
 
111 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados:  Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos”  
Neighbors Far Apart:  The Secrets of the Crisis Between Spain and Morocco] (Barcelona:  Circulo de 
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112 Agence France Presse, July 20, 2002, International section.  “Isla de Perejil, La Consecuencia de 
15 Meses de Tension entre España y Marruecos [Perejil Island,” [The Consequence of 15 Months of 
Tensions Between Spain and Morocco].  Obtained from www.nexis.com; translations by author.  All the 
above-mentioned dates and facts come from this source. 
113 In 1925, the Spanish Army sought to repel an advance by the Rif Emirate rebels who sought an 
end to Spanish Colonial rule in Morocco.  The Spanish advance included toxic gas attacks on the rebels.  
Then-Colonel Francisco Franco led one of the legions in this attack.  Bouarfa, Mohamed, Marruecos y 
Epsaña:  El Eterno Problema [Morocco and Spain:  The Eternal Problem], (Malaga: Editorial Algazara, 
2002), 176. 
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July 20, 2002, International section.  Obtained from www.nexis.com; translations by author.  All the above-
mentioned dates and facts come from this source. 
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Initially, both NATO and the EU “lamented the crisis, but described it as a 
bilateral issue.”115  On 13 July, however, EC President Romano Prodi warned Morocco 
of “grave consequences” if it continued to occupy the island.116  On 14 July, the Danish 
Government, acting as EU president, demanded that Morocco withdraw its troops from 
the island.  The next day, NATO officials asked Morocco to respect the status quo.  On 
17 July, after Madrid informed the UN Security Council and NATO, Spanish Marines 
occupied the island and dislodged the Moroccan soldiers.117  Moroccan Foreign Minister 
Mohammed Ben Aissa responded by stating that Morocco may declare war on Spain.118 
Between 19 and 20 July, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intervened by 
urging both leaders to return the island to its demilitarized status before the standoff.119  
Spanish Foreign Minister Palacios pledged that Spanish troops would be withdrawn if 
Morocco pledged not to remilitarize the island.120  When Morocco accepted this 
condition and pledged not to return to the island, the Spanish troops left.121 
D. SECURITIZED ISSUES 
Spain’s geographic, cultural and historical ties to North Africa give Spain a valid 
argument for seeing itself as the diplomatic link between the two regions.  But many of 
Spain’s securitized and politicized issues concern the region.  These issues include: 
 The security of Spain’s fishing rights in waters off the coast of Morocco 
(politicized). 
 Sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla (securitized). 
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 Illegal immigration from developing nations in the region (securitized). 
 A balance of power between Algeria and Morocco (politicized).122 
Of particular concern to Spain is the illegal immigration issue.  Illegal 
immigration from Africa to Europe has increased dramatically in the last few years.  
According to the 2004 Atlas of Moroccan Immigration, some 300,000 Moroccans live 
legally in Spain, over 25% of the total legal immigrant population.123  The Atlas 
estimates that over 200,000 more live there illegally.  Throughout the past decade, images 
of African immigrants in makeshift boats being rescued by the Spanish Coast Guard have 
sparked strong sentiments among Spaniards.  A 2005 survey by the Real Instituto Elcano 
(a non-governmental agency that studies Spanish public opinion) revealed that 74% of 
Spaniards feel that immigration is Spain’s most important foreign policy issue, and 94% 
of those surveyed feel that Morocco is not doing enough to curb the flow.124 
Morocco is arguably undergoing the fastest rate of democratization in Africa.  
Along with constitutional reform, the monarchy has embarked in drastic modernization 
campaigns—from massive infrastructure projects, to recognizing civil rights.125  With 
this general goal in mind, Morocco has securitized or politicized the following: 
 The challenge of illegal Islamic movements on the monarchy (securitized). 
 Morocco’s poverty and quality of life (securitized). 
 Morocco’s economic relationship with the EU (securitized). 
 Relations with its African neighbors, particularly Algeria (securitized). 
 Territorial integrity, including the annexation of Ceuta and Melilla 
(politicized). 
 Sovereignty over the Western Sahara (securitized).126    
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Despite the increasing rate of modernization, Morocco faces an uphill battle.  The 
2004 Report on Human Development ranks Morocco 125th of 177 nations (the 2008 
update ranks Morocco 127th, and Spain, 16th).127  About 70% of its 30 million people 
are younger than 35 years of age.  Approximately 50% of the population is illiterate, and 
unemployment hovers at 15%.  About 19% of Moroccans live in poverty.128  The 
pressure for emigration is high, as is the potential for unrest.  There is evidence that King 
Mohammed VI has slowed down modernization in favor of social order.  Islamist groups 
are thriving amidst the social strains in Morocco.  Some of these movements are being 
integrated into the political arena, but others are not being recognized, likely because of 
their perceived threat to the throne.   
E. COMPETING EXPLANATION:  SPAIN SEEKS TO KEEP UP WITH 
FRENCH INFLUENCE IN THE MAGHREB 
Before considering the influence of reassurance strategies in this case, this section 
weighs the evidence for the most plausible competing explanation:  that Spain was driven 
by competition with France for influence and economic ties in North Africa.  At the time 
of the Perejil standoff, France had strong relations with Morocco. French President 
Jacques Chirac’s first visit as head of state had been to Morocco, and Mohammed’s first 
visit as head of state had been to France.129   The two leaders quickly became close 
friends.  According to Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, Spanish Prime Minister Jose 
Maria Aznar was convinced that during the Perejil standoff, Chirac had guaranteed his 
support to Mohammed, and may have encouraged him to occupy the island.130  In 2002, 
it was revealed that France had blocked a proposed EC declaration of solidarity towards 
Spain during the crisis.131   
 
127 Del Miño, Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos, 46. 
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Aznar felt that a quick rapprochement with Morocco would curtail what he 
perceived were French efforts at minimizing Spain’s ties to North Africa. In June 2003, 
Aznar told Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou that “businessmen need to see us 
bonding; that will give them confidence.”132  Jettou allegedly told his aides later that day 
that time had been wasted over Perejil, and that confidence would take time to restore.133  
Despite Aznar’s efforts, Morocco clearly preferred to do business with France.  In 2007, 
Morocco agreed to French civilian and military projects worth 3 billion Euros.134  
Morocco also picked French Energy Company Areva over Spanish company Iberdola to 
build its first nuclear reactor.135  Finally, Morocco purchased a 470 million Euro French 
attack frigate with state of the art technology.136  Moroccan Parliamentarian Abdelila 
Benkiran stated, “the French President’s visit may have affected Spanish interests in 
Morocco after signing contracts with France.”137  Spanish businessmen lamented the 
deals as a missed opportunity for Spanish business.138   
In addition to economic ties, Nicolas Sarkozy, who became president in 2007, 
sought to increase France’s political influence in the Maghreb.  As candidate, he 
proposed that a new multilateral regime replace the Spanish-initiated Barcelona Process, 
which had been the forum for Euro-Maghreb relations since 1995.  This 38-member 
multilateral organization had failed to reach meaningful consensus on any issue, as 
Israel’s membership caused frequent boycotts by the Muslim member states.139  On its 
10th Anniversary summit in 2005, delegates who did attend could not even come to a 
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consensus on a definition for terrorism.  European newspapers called the event a “fiasco.”  
Three years later, Sarkozy launched the Union of the Mediterranean in Paris.  Although 
the summit did not achieve any meaningful consensus, all but one Arab leader attended.  
Many Spanish newspapers used the contrast as proof that Spain’s diplomatic influence in 
the Mediterranean was inferior to France’s.  In other words, Spain is no France in the 
international system. 
An editorial in a prominent Spanish newspaper called for a new Spanish role that 
“remains within the limits of a realistic pragmatism.”140  This pragmatism would involve 
forging as many commercial contracts as possible, while keeping a lower profile on 
Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara.  Aznar’s successor as prime minister, the Socialist 
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, adopted this approach.  The week before the Paris Summit 
in July 2008, as all eyes were on Sarkozy, Zapatero visited several nations in the 
Maghreb (including Morocco), and achieved important economic and political 
agreements.  In December, Spain and Morocco signed a financial agreement worth 520 
million Euros.141  Although the accord pales in comparison to the 3 billion Euros in 
agreements with France in 2007, this was Spain’s largest economic cooperation 
agreement in its history.142  This agreement enabled Spain to keep its place as Morocco’s 
second largest trade partner (after France).143   
Although the French-Spanish competition for Moroccan business certainly 
motivated Spain to resolve its differences with Morocco, this explanation fails to explain 
why Morocco sought rapprochement with Spain.  In addition, the timing of the French 
agreements with Morocco comes well after the de-escalation of Spain-Morocco tensions.  
The reassurance explanation covers these gaps, and is more convincing overall. 
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F. THE SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE AND RECIPROCATION 
After the Perejil crisis, tensions continued high, as King Mohammed began a 
diplomatic blitz to bring attention to Spain’s colonies in Morocco.  However, in late 
2002, a series of events gave Morocco an opportunity to send a signal of reassurance.  In 
November, an oil tanker split in half near the Northern coast of Spain, releasing 
thousands of tons of crude into the Atlantic Ocean.  It devastated the fishing industry in 
Northern Spain, which was already affected by Morocco’s denial of its fishing waters the 
year before.  On 13 December, Mohammed took a “leap in the dark” by offering Spain 
use of Morocco’s territorial waters for Spanish fishing boats that had been affected by the 
oil spill.144  In a clear example of twenty-first century reassurance, Mohammed sent a 
signal that enhanced Spain’s position in a politicized issue—fishing rights.  The king 
personally called Aznar and Spanish King Juan Carlos to inform them of his decision, 
demonstrating a transparency of his intentions.145   
The Spanish Government felt reassured after the Moroccan King’s gesture.   
Aznar acknowledged the gesture at a press conference during the Copenhagen Council of 
Europe Summit that was taking place at the time, giving Morocco a much-needed 
positive image on the European stage.146  Three weeks later, the spiral of hope began.  
Bilateral working groups began working towards a resolution of political, immigration, 
and maritime issues.147  In a further demonstration of Moroccan transparency, 
Mohammed personally received Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacios in Agadir on 30 
January 2003 to discuss the normalization of relations.148  Moroccan Sub–Minister of 
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Foreign Relations Taieb Fassi Fihri recalls from this meeting, “His Majesty barely 
mentioned the crisis…he preferred to talk about the future, about the preparations for the 
summit, about our relations with the EU.”149  The visit led to the return of both 
ambassadors the following week.  Four months later, on 16 May 2003, a terrorist attack 
in Casablanca killed 33.  Spain quickly reassured Morocco by offering 300 million Euros 
in immediate aid, as well as technological and intelligence cooperation in the ensuing 
investigation.  Spain essentially enhanced Morocco’s position in its securitized issue of 
extremist domestic terrorism.150  In October, the EU (without objection from Spain) 
agreed to grant preferential access to 96% of Moroccan agricultural products—enhancing 
Morocco’s securitized issue of fostering better economic ties with Europe.151  Morocco 
reciprocated in November 2003, by agreeing to resume monthly talks on illegal 
immigration - enhancing Spain’s position on one of its securitized issues.152 
On 10 February 2004, Spain and Morocco began planning a joint military 
exercise, called “Atlas 04.”153  The confidence building measure (CBM) took place in 
both nations.  It involved 18 Spanish Air Force aircraft and 500 Spanish troops, and 16 
Moroccan Air Force aircraft and 130 Moroccan troops, in search and rescue and crisis 
reaction missions.154  Both nations exchanged tactics and procedures, thereby reassuring 
each other in a more traditional example of the action in the military domain.   
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Morocco’s cooperation after the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks on Madrid 
commuter trains ironically sped the spiral of hope between the two nations.  The attack 
killed 201 Spaniards.  Several of the terrorists were Moroccan citizens and much of the 
planning took place in Morocco.  The week after the attacks, a connection was made 
between these attacks and the Casablanca attack.155  The attacks brought a flurry of 
speculation that the cold relations between Spain and Morocco “caused a critical 
breakdown in communication over terrorists’ movements.”156  Morocco’s cooperation in 
the investigation and its eventual trial of the suspects in Morocco successfully reassured 
Spain and helped further the rapprochement.   
Spain reciprocated these signals of reassurance in January 2005.  Spain’s King 
Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia visited Morocco and re-launched several joint projects that 
had been frozen at the time of the Perejil crisis.  Among these projects was a new electric 
plant built by Spanish Energy Giant Endesa that would supply about 16% of Morocco’s 
electricity.157  In the following month, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel 
Moratinos announced new initiatives to regularize Moroccan immigrants in Spain, and 
urged all EU members to elevate Morocco’s status with respect to the EU, including 
granting policies to Morocco similar to those grant
In March 2005, Zapatero visited Morocco to discuss the Western Sahara issue.  
The Moroccan Government had been presenting its plan of autonomy for Western Sahara 
in several nations.159  The plan called for Moroccan sovereignty over an autonomous 
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Western Sahara.  Zapatero’s openness to this plan reassured Morocco in one of its most 
highly securitized issues—Western Sahara. Morocco reciprocated two months later by 
granting 119 fishing licenses to EU fishing companies (of which 100 are Spanish) as part 
of an EU-Morocco fisheries accord.160  The issue that began the Spain-Morocco standoff 
in 2001 was now resolved.  The spiral of hope continued.  During the July 2007 EU-
Morocco Bilateral Association Council Meeting in Brussels, Spain petitioned the 
European Defense Council to invite Morocco to the September 2007 summit.161  Spanish 
Secretary of State for European Affairs Alberto Navarro expressed a need for Morocco to 
be more involved in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), especially since 
Moroccan troops participated in the Bosnia-Herzegovina mission, and because of the 
Moroccan military’s role in enforcing EU immigration policy.162  Navarro mentioned 
that “the bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco are currently at their best, and we 
have Rabat’s full cooperation on the efforts against illegal immigration. . .”163 
G. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, 
and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its 
willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to 
“break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, 
through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well.  Once 
it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high. 
This first condition is supported by this case.  Morocco’s signal of reassurance is 
easy to identify in that it was the first positive diplomatic step taken by either nation after 
the Perejil crisis.  Morocco had arguably begun the impasse with Spain by suspending the 
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talks on fishing rights for Spanish vessels.  The gesture of allowing Spanish fishing 
vessels was the signal Spain needed to begin its long-awaited cooperation with Morocco.  
As predicted by this hypothesis, Spain indeed reciprocated. 
2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase 
the chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime 
may encourage reciprocation. 
This second hypothesis is not supported by this case.  Rather than being prodded 
by a multilateral organization, Spain reciprocated Morocco’s initial reassurance signal 
primarily due to economic and political interests in the Maghreb.  The competing 
explanation, that Spain sought to keep up with France’s engagement in the region, is 
relevant here and undermines this hypothesis.  During the Perejil crisis, the EU could not 
offer its solidarity for Spain because of France’s dissent, nor could it encourage Spain to 
concede the standoff because of strong support by other members.  Division in the EU 
rendered the international regime irrelevant as the standoff evolved. 
Once reassurance signals were exchanged, several EU nations, namely Sweden 
and Ireland, pressed the EU to demand an explanation for the imprisonment of Moroccan 
journalists who had been critical of the Moroccan government.164  In fact, the 
Scandinavian states and Ireland proposed to add a paragraph to the long-awaited fisheries 
treaty that addressed the Western Sahara issue, namely, the issue of alleged Moroccan 
curtailment of civil liberties in Western Sahara.165  Ironically, both Spain and France 
found themselves united in opposing such an addition.166  So, instead of being a source 
of encouragement to reciprocate Morocco’s reassurance signals, the EU may have 
actually been an impediment to Spanish rapprochement with Mo
3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through 
political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of 
reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.   
The third hypothesis is supported in this case.  Only when transparency faltered 
did tensions rise.  The frequent meetings between Spanish and Moroccan leaders after the 
 




                                                
Perejil standoff increased transparency and led to rapprochement.  Additionally, the CBM 
exercise in 2004 allowed both militaries to work together and develop relationships.  The 
bilateral cooperation that followed the terrorist attacks allowed both nations to 
demonstrate their defensive intentions. France’s involvement also helped in this regard, 
as more diplomacy was required to keep France “in the loop” of the rapprochement. 
4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is 
perceived as costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the 
reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate. 
This condition is difficult to measure, because, as explained in Chapter II, cost is 
interpreted differently in different nations.  Mohammed’s invitation for Spanish ships to 
use Moroccan waters may not have been costly for Morocco, although there had been 
pressure from the military to keep Moroccan waters closed to European fishing.  But the 
Spanish Government welcomed Mohammed’s empathy, especially because it concerned 
a highly politicized issue for Spain.  The signal was small, but led to greater cooperation.  
So, in this case, Larson’s argument that small signals can lead to greater reciprocal 
gestures is more applicable than Kydd’s argument that only costly signals are effective.   
H. CONCLUSION 
Rapprochement between Morocco and Spain began when Morocco sent a signal 
of reassurance by allowing Spanish fishing vessels to operate in Moroccan waters.  Until 
then, relations had been tense, especially during the Perejil crisis.  Of the four conditions, 
two were present.  First, the weaker state, Morocco, was the first to reassure. Second, 
transparency was prevalent before, throughout, and after the period of tensions.  
Today, the relationship continues to be fragile, especially when securitized issues 
are involved, such as immigration, Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara.  On this last 
issue, French Ambassador to Madrid Olivier Schrameck writes, “With much bravery the 
Spanish government has made a diplomatic shift by supporting a process that will not 
guarantee Western Sahara more than a more or less wide-ranging autonomy, inside 
Morocco.”167  Zapatero’s recent flexibility in the Western Sahara issue has enraged 
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POLISARIO front leaders, and even hurt his approval ratings.  Meanwhile, the 
Scandinavian states restrain further rapprochement with their civil liberties concerns.168  
Could Western Sahara be the limit to the Spain-Morocco rapprochement?   
While the explanation that Spain sought rapprochement with Morocco to stay 
competitive with French interests is valid, it is incomplete.  It does not account for the 
fact that Morocco initiated the rapprochement.  The reassurance exchange demonstrated 
Spain and Morocco’s awareness of each other’s securitized issues.  Morocco’s initial 
signal of reassurance began a spiral of hope based on a series of positive gestures.  Given 
the impetus of this spiral, the outlook is positive in the Spain-Morocco relationship. 
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV. CASE STUDY #2:  EXPLAINING THE RAPPROCHEMENT 
BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA 
 
Figure 2.   Italy-Libya area of tensions (From Jesuit Rescue Service/USA,  
http://www.jrsusa.org/images/lampedusa_map.jpg) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 15 April 1986, Libya launched two Scud missiles at the Italian island of 
Lampedusa in an apparent retaliation for an American attack on Libya a few hours 
before.169  This event capped off two years of heightened tensions between Italy and 
Libya that included Libya-sponsored terrorist attacks in Italy.  Twelve years after the 
Scud attack, the prime minister of Italy and the same Libyan ruler who directed the 
attacks toasted in celebration of a friendship treaty.  What can explain this dramatic and 
positive rapprochement between two bitter antagonists with a deeply rooted history of 
colonialism and mistrust?  This chapter argues that after years of cool relations 
overshadowed by international isolation, Libya sent a signal of reassurance to the west 
that played into one of Italy’s most securitized issues.  The signal was enough to reassure 
Italy that Libya no longer had suspicious intentions.  Soon after Libya’s signal, relations 
between the two Southern Mediterranean neighbors improved dramatically.  This case 
represents another success of reassurance.  Three of the four independent variables were 
                                                 
169 “Libyan Missile Fire Protested by Italy,” The Washington Post, 16 April 1986, First Section, A23. 
 51
 52
d French.   
                                                
present during the rapprochement.  The most plausible competing explanation for this 
rapprochement is that Italy successfully buck-passed a policy of compellence to the 
United States, and benefited from Libyan concessions as a result of U.S. pressure.  This 
chapter will conclude that this competing explanation accounts for part of the case 
outcome but not all of it.  Libya’s signal of reassurance prompted Italy to push for the 
elimination of international sanctions on Libya and increase its trade with the North 
African nation.  
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Libya’s tumultuous relationship with Italy dates back to 1911, when the young 
European power invaded the North African nation in its attempt to profit from a 
weakening Ottoman Empire.170  Italy’s claim to colonize Libya was internationally 
recognized by the end of World War I.  The 1920s brought about an intense colonization, 
mostly by Northern Italian estate owners who sought more land for agriculture.171  By 
1940, over 110,000 Italian settlers had come to Libya to develop over 225,000 hectares of 
land.172  Fascist colonial policy sought to exclude Libyans from any development 
project, thereby creating animosity among the native population.173  Moreover, Italy 
severely punished any Libyan resistance movement, sending “tens of thousands of 
Libyan insurrectionists to their deaths in concentration camps.”174  The colonial era 
continued until the end of World War II, when a defeated Italy had to hand over Libyan 
sovereignty to the victorious British an
On 24 December 1951, King Idris Al-Sanusi declared the creation of the Libyan 
state.175  The young country faced enormous difficulties:  90% illiteracy, mass poverty, 
and an infrastructure mostly destroyed during the North African campaigns of World War 
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of 
oil.   
micino (Rome) 
and Vienna airport terrorist attacks, and the 1986 U.S. attack on Libya.180 
C. 
                                                
II.  Meanwhile, some 50,000 Italian settlers remained in Libya, and owned most of the 
fertile land.176   A dependence on foreign aid gave way to the rapid growth of Libya’s oil 
industry.  Libya became “the fourth most prolific producer of oil.”177  The growth of 
Libyan nationalism and Pan-Arabism, combined with oil revenues, made the environment 
favorable for Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi to lead a successful coup d’état in 1969 that 
transformed Libya into a military dictatorship.178  It also led to the expulsion in 1970 of 
approximately 20,000 Italian settlers (of which some had been born in Libya).179  
Despite Qadhafi’s animosity towards Italy, he continued selling Italy massive amounts 
Relations between Libya and the West deteriorated during the 1980s.  Qadhafi’s 
strong opposition to Israel and apparent support for international terrorism caused a sharp 
rise in tensions with the United States.  These tensions were highlighted by the 1982 U.S. 
shoot-down of two Libyan jet fighters, a U.S.-imposed embargo on refined petroleum 
products from Libya, the revelation that Libya had supported the 1985 Fiu
RECENT TENSIONS 
On 27 December 1985, four gunmen entered Rome’s Fiumicino airport and threw 
grenades at the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters.  The ensuing shooting 
rampage ended with fourteen dead and more than 60 injured.181  The reaction to this 
terrorist attack was immediate, as Italians throughout the country felt threatened by terror.  
The attacks were quickly traced to an offshoot of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
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rated the spiral of fear that had begun with Qhadafi’s repudiation 
of Italia
April, operatives with links to a Libyan diplomat in East Berlin placed a bomb in a West 
                                                
(PLO), with support from Libya.  Three days after the attacks, Vice Secretary of the 
Italian Liberal Party Antonio Patuelli said, “tears are not enough to avoid other 
massacres.  What is needed is a reappraisal of Italian foreign policy towards countries 
such as Qadhafi’s Libya, Syria and Iran.”182  Meanwhile, Libya’s official news agency 
JANA called the attacks “heroic actions by the sons of the martyrs” of Arab refugees 
killed in Beirut in 1982.183  On 30 December, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi 
summoned Qadhafi’s envoy to protest Libya’s open support for the attacks.184  Craxi 
clearly directed his ire at Libya when he vowed to curb “states that allow terrorist groups 
to organize their bloody undertakings through tolerance or even support.  Those who 
called the terrorist attack an act of heroism have unveiled a bloody and fanatical face.  
There can be no heroism in a massacre of innocent and defenseless civilians.”185  Craxi 
had effectively securitized terrorism and made a strong implication that Libya’s support 
for this securitized threat merited new Italian policy measures.  Libya’s open support of 
terrorism greatly accele
n colonization. 
In January 1986, the Reagan Administration froze all Libyan assets in the United 
States and issued a travel ban.186  Italy warned Italian businesses not to “exploit the U.S.-
ordered withdrawal of American companies from Libya.”187 While Italy initially 
preferred to keep its policy in line with the rest of Europe’s, the evidence of Libyan 
connections to the Rome attack forced Italy to consider unilateral sanctions.188 On 5 
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Berlin nightclub frequented by U.S. servicemen.189  The explosion killed two U.S. 
servicemen and another person, while injuring over some 230, including 63 
Americans.190  The incident securitized the issue of terrorism in the United States, 
prompting the 15 April attack.  Shortly after the U.S. attack, Libya launched two Scud 
missiles towards Italy.  Neither missile hit its target in Lampedusa.  But the attack 
heightened tensions between Italy and Libya.  
Italy put its armed forces on maximum alert shortly after the Scud attack.  
American naval vessels “took positions off Lampedusa along with Italian Navy units.”191  
Craxi sent a note of protest to Libya and gave “clear directives to the Italian Armed 
Forces.” 192  In a press conference, Craxi asked, “What do you think we should do next 
time?  Send another note of protest?  That would not be the view of the Italian 
Government, nor would it be the view of the overwhelming number of Italians.”193  He 
added, “we would not ever want to find ourselves in a condition where we need to react 
using military force…that is why we have invited the government of Tripoli to show 
caution, reflection, and responsibility.”194 In May, Qhadafi responded, “from now on, 
vis-à-vis Egypt, Italy and any country which we consider in a hostile position to us, we 
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new U.S. campaigns from Italy.”195  In September, Craxi said that had the Libyan 
missiles not missed, Qadhafi “would not be at his post now.”196  Italy and Libya seemed 
to be on the brink of war. 
The coercive pressures on Libya did not initially change Libyan behavior.  On 21 
December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 exploded and crashed in Scotland, killing 259.  Less 
than one year later, UTA flight 772 exploded and crashed in Niger, killing 171.197  
Evidence strongly suggests that Libyan operatives were behind both incidents.  On 14 
November 1991, the United States obtained a grand jury indictment of two Libyan 
intelligence operatives working in Malta.198 France and the United Kingdom (the 
homelands of many of the victims) joined in the demands that Libya hand over the 
operatives for trial.199 Furthermore, these nations demanded that Libya renounce 
terrorism, compensate the victims’ families, and accept responsibility for its actions.200  
D. SECURITIZED ISSUES 
Italy seeks to consolidate its position as a middle power.201  With regards to the 
Maghreb, Italians have felt a special connection in terms of geography, colonialism, and 
economic opportunities.  Italy feels that it has a special responsibility to modernize the 
region after decades of colonial exploitation. At the same time, fear, xenophobia, and 
distrust exist as Italians cope with the reality of religious extremism, international 
terrorism, and immigration.  Italy’s pertinent securitized and politicized issues include: 
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 International terrorism (securitized). 
 Access to energy (securitized). 
 Business access in North Africa (politicized). 
 Immigration from North Africa (securitized). 
Libya has heavily depended on its oil and natural gas supply to finance its 
economy.  Because of Europe’s proximity and need for oil, Libya’s main interest is to 
keep its buyers buying.  Libya has also undergone a drive for modernization, which 
involves building roads, providing better education, and eradicating poverty.   Qadhafi is 
also interested in maintaining his power and repelling challenges to his rule.  The main 
challenge is from radical Islamic groups that have garnered support from the 
impoverished Libyans.  With regard to the region, Libya’s securitized issues include: 
 Uncompensated colonial atrocities (securitized). 
 Internal opposition to government by Islamist groups (securitized). 
 Access to oil and gas markets (securitized). 
 Pan-Arabism (politicized). 
 Outside intervention (securitized). 
E. COMPETING EXPLANATION:  ITALY WAS ABLE TO IMPROVE ITS 
RELATIONS WITH LIBYA BECAUSE IT “BUCK-PASSED” COERCIVE 
DIPLOMACY TO THE UNITED STATES 
Did Italy “free-ride” on the West’s diplomatic initiatives towards Libya?  “Free-
riding” has been incorporated into the “buck-passing” strategy in the study of 
international relations.  According to Mearsheimer, “a buck passer attempts to get another 
state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor, while it remains on 
the sidelines.”202   A buck-passer usually pursues one of four options.  First, it can seek 
to improve diplomatic relations with the aggressor so that the main attention is given to 
the 
tensions between the aggressor and the “buck-catcher.”203  Second, it can refrain from 
maintaining close relations with the buck-catcher, so that relations with the aggressor can 
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be easier to improve.  Third, a buck-passer can increase its military power, so that the 
aggressor is deterred from attacking the buck-passer and focuses instead on the buck-
catcher.  Finally, a buck-passer can aid the buck-catcher by increasing its power to deter 
(and defend against) the aggressor.204  In this case, the aggressor is Libya, the b
s Italy, and the buck-catchers are the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Italy’s first sign of buck passing occurred shortly after the Rome airport attack.  
Despite the tensions, Italy did not object to the EEC decision to refrain from imposing 
sanctions.  By not imposing sanctions, Italy passed the buck to the United States, which 
had imposed sanctions a week after the attacks.  Italy did however freeze Libyan 
assets.205  Italy also became the first European state to unilaterally suspend its arms sales 
to Libya.206  These actions pleased the United States. But Italy also kept a subtle, yet real 
engagement with Libya.  Craxi’s successor, Giulio Andreotti, visited Libya several 
times.207  In a 5 June 1991 joint statement that followed a meeting between Andreotti and 
Qadhafi, both states expressed their “eagerness to give fresh impetus to their bilateral 
relations.”  Meanwhile, Italy’s oil imports from Libya increased during the heightened 
s with the United States, from 19% of total oil imports in 1980 to 33% in 1987.208   
In 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 731, formally 
demanding that Libya respond to the allegations of involvement in the Pan Am and UTA 
attacks.  Libya ignored the demands, prompting Resolution 748.  This resolution imposed 
a ban on all flights into and out of Libya, an arms and aircraft parts embargo, and a 
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re indicative of a buck-passer 
because
imports
                                                
diplomatic isolation of the North African state.209  As the passage of this resolution 
became imminent, Italy emphasized that its actions would be in accordance with the UN 
mandate.  On 23 March, Foreign Minister Gianni DeMichelis stated, “We obviously hope 
that a solution is found that would contain the situation.  But Italy will abide by the UN 
decisions as well as the EU position.”210  These words a
 it demonstrated that Italy would not craft its own policy, but instead endorse the 
attitude that was coming out of Brussels and New York.   
Although the sanctions did not apply to Libyan oil exports, they had a profound 
effect.  Libya’s per-capita GDP fell from $7,311 to $5,896 between 1992 and 1999.  By 
1998, oil export earnings fell to their lowest level since the 1986 oil price crash.211  
Libya’s tourist industry and commodity imports suffered from the flight ban.212  
Meanwhile, Italy’s economic ties with Libya remained strong.  Some 20.9% of Libyan 
 were from Italy, while Libyan oil imports by Italy remained at over 30% of the 
total (19.35 million tons) in 1995.  Libya continued to be Italy’s biggest supplier of oil.213 
In 1996, Italy’s new center-left Government’s policy towards Libya was best 
summarized by Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini:  “The possibility of dialogue with Libya 
exists and is being explored because Italy believes in the possibility of a gradual 
normalization of its relations with Tripoli.”214  This clashed with U.S. policy, which 
signaled a tough stance amidst Qadhafi’s refusal to hand over the two alleged Lockerbie 
terrorists.  In August, the U.S. Congress adopted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA), which imposed sanctions on any non-U.S. company that invested over $40 
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Americ
ino attack.218  Libya also broke ties with 
radical 
ions despite agreeing to 
multilateral condemnation.  In all, instead of a competing explanation, the buck-passing 
ent may actually com
           
million in Libya’s oil industry.215 Shortly after the U.S. vote, a spokesperson for the 
Italian Government told reporters, “we will follow this action with much concern. . .  The 
an law on sanctions is inappropriate in the war on terrorism, and in the judgment 
of most experts and even many Americans, violates many norms of international law.”216   
By buck-passing compellence to the United States, Italy achieved its national 
security objectives regarding Libya without much cost.  In 1992, shortly after the UN 
sanctions were imposed, Libya renounced terrorism.217  In 1999, Libya expelled the Abu 
Nidal organization, responsible for the Fiumic
Palestinian groups, shut down terrorist camps inside its borders, and extradited 
Islamist militants and suspected terrorists.219   
Whether or not Italy intended to be a buck-passer falls outside the scope of this 
thesis.  But, if Italy’s intent was to pass the buck, it may have resulted in an inadvertent 
reassurance to Libya.  By keeping subtle diplomatic relations, Italy kept Libya’s access to 
the European energy market open.  Italy did not want to antagonize the United States, but 
may have felt that full support for U.S. policy might have increased the terrorist threat 
while limiting Italy’s access to oil.  In all, Italy benefited from the tough American 
stance; but it also benefited by not fully embracing U.S. policy.  By buck-passing, Italy 
demonstrated to Libya its desire to continue bilateral relat
argum plement the reassurance argument. 
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n of African States 
announced it would no longer enforce UN sancti
that the status quo regime was less threatening than an Islamic revolutionary regime.  So 
THE SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE AND RECIPROCATION 
Because Italy may have felt that further tensions could lead to more ter
, it opposed military action in 1986.  In a speech, Andreotti 
The Libyan issue cannot be solved through a military action… Since some 
American naval bases are located in Italy, we would inevitably be the 
target of a potential reaction. On the other hand though, I don’t want to be 
considered as Libya’s lawyer and have no intention to be the main 
supporter of Qadhafi’s beatification. Surely, I believe that a diplomatic 
dialogue with the Colonel won’t be harmful for anyone.220 
Although these words were not very reassuring to Libya, they were not hostile 
either.  Italy continued buying large amounts of oil and gas.  But, as American sanctions 
tightened after 1996, Qadhafi began to face threats from within.  Unemployment reached 
30% and inflation 50%, triggering civil unrest.221  At least two attempted military coups 
challenged Qadhafi, and an Islamic insurgency gained momentum.222  A dispute 
emerged between the regime’s pragmatists, who wanted Libya to improve its relations 
with the West, and the hardliners who wanted to stay defiant.223  It seemed that 
compellence was having its desired effect.  But as pressure on Qadhafi grew from the 
inside, it started cracking from outside.  In June 1998, the Organizatio
ons unless the United States agreed to 
conduct the Lockerbie trial in a third country.224  Other countries also began reevaluating 
effect of UN sanctions.  Although many feel that Libya’s concessions in 1999 were the 
result of American pressure, the growing international support for reintegration suggests 
that internal—not external—issues pressured Libya to change its posture. 
Italy may have noticed the growing domestic threat to Qadhafi and determined 
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w fell on Libya to reassure Italy and the rest of the world that it preferred 
to impr
atural gas annually.231  In 2001, Qadhafi condemned the September 11 attacks and 
ffered his support in locating Al Qaeda operatives.232  Italy reciprocated by increasing 
                                                
the Italian Government decided to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate.  In a joint 
declaration on 9 July 1998, Italy “acknowledged its colonial responsibilities” and pledged 
to indemnify the Libyan victims of colonial policies, help Libya clear mines placed 
during colonization, and aid in Libyan modernization.225 In August 1998, the United 
States and the United Kingdom agreed to hold the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands.226  
The burden no
ove relations.  In April 1999, Qadhafi announced that Libya would comply with 
Resolution 731, and handed suspects Abdel Basset Ali Mohammed al-Megrahi and 
Lamen Khalifa over for trial in The Hague.227  UN sanctions were immediately 
suspended.228 
While the United States did not immediately reciprocate Libya’s reassurance, 
Italy did.  The day after suspension, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini met Qadhafi 
in Tripoli.  During their meeting, Qadhafi told Dini, “Libya will become Italy’s bridge to 
Africa... And Italy will become Libya’s door to Europe.”229  Eight months later, Italian 
Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema became the first European head of government to visit 
Libya since Andreotti’s last visit in 1991.230  On 6 August 1999, both nations agreed to 
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nce is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and 
colonial responsibilities in 1998.  Italy’s willingness to cooperate (and the American 
decisio
weaker fi’s decision to hand over the suspected bombers began 
a “spira
                                                
pressure on the EU to lift its sanctions and even threatened to lift them unilaterally.233  In 
October 2004, Qadhafi lifted a ban on former Italian settlers that had been expelled from 
 
Libya in 1970.234  Two days later, the EU lifted its sa
ed through 2008, when Italy agreed to pay Libya $5 billion in reparations for 
l era atrocities (see conclusion). 
THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
1. A signal of reassura
the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to 
cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility 
cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that 
it wants to cooperate as well.  Once it does, the chances that the stronger state 
will reciprocate are high. 
The first condition was present in this case, but the willingness of the weaker state 
to initiate reassurance was likely helped by indications from the stronger state that it 
would reciprocate.  In this case, rapprochement began when Italy acknowledged its 
n to hold the Lockerbie trial in a third country) put the burden on Libya—the 
 state—to reassure.  Qadha
l of hope” that led to the suspension of UN sanctions and further rapprochement.    
2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the 
chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime may 
encourage reciprocation. 
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importa
sent his signal of reassurance.  Italy was quick to reciprocate unilaterally, as its leaders 
re-enga
In the case of Italian relations with Libya, transparency has been challenging 
given L
warned Qadhafi of the 1986 attack the day before it occurred, potentially saving his 
life.238
                                                
This condition is also supported by this case.  Both the UN and EU played 
nt roles.  The international community dropped the UN sanctions when Qhadafi 
ged Qadhafi in order to complete many commercial contracts that had been 
impeded by the sanctions.  Italy led the push for the EU to drop its sanctions in 2004.  
3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political 
rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more 
likely to be reciprocated.  
ibya’s colonial resentment and Italy’s fears of Libyan ties to terrorism.  After 
decades of tensions, the 1984 meeting between Andreotti and Qadhafi began a period of 
rapprochement.  Andreotti acknowledged Italy’s commitment to Libya’s modernization, 
and kept the door open for an eventual compensation for Libya’s colonial hardships.236  
Meanwhile, Qadhafi agreed to pay debts incurred from Italy throughout the 1970s.237 
Qhadafi’s trust towards Craxi was enhanced when the Italian prime minister 
  According to James Phillips, research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “this 
seems like an attempt by some Italian leaders to try to ingratiate themselves with the 
Libyans, probably with the hope of paving the way for increased trade or investment.”239   
4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as 
costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, 
then it is likely to reciprocate. 
Qadhafi’s signal of reassurance was costly because there was no guarantee that it 
would be reciprocated.  Furthermore, Qadhafi abandoned his radical, anti-Western policy 
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rom the Muslim World.  Although there was sufficient 
certaint
will be over 25 years, and will consist of investments in infrastructure such as the long-
desired
ter 
role in Libya’s change in posture.  In order to save his regime, Qadhafi may have had to 
reassure the world so that Libya could return to the world economy and reduce the 
                                                
that had won him support f
y that turning over the suspected terrorists would get the UN sanctions dropped, 
Qadhafi risked a political backlash in the region.  A case can be made that Qadhafi’s 
decision was a result of compellence, and not reassurance.  But there is no evidence that 
the United States was planning an attack.  Meanwhile, Italy was reluctant to carry out any 
policy that violated sanctions.  In all, the burden was on Qadhafi to send a costly signal.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Today, Libya and Italy enjoy the warmest relations in their history as neighbors.  
In August 2008, Italy agreed to pay Libya $5 billion in war reparations.  The payments 
 highway from the Egyptian border to the Tunisian border; housing projects; 
pensions for victims of Italian mines; and scholarships.240  Libya agreed to cooperate 
further on the illegal immigration issue, agreeing to more joint patrols and satellite 
monitoring of Libya’s southern borders.241  On 2 March 2009, Prime Minister Berlusconi 
addressed the Libyan Parliament in the presence of Qadhafi, as well as former Prime 
Ministers Andreotti and Dini—important players in this years-long rapprochement.242 
There are still many challenges in the Libya-Italy relationship.  Italian 
Nationalism, represented by the Northern League, and Libyan Islamic fundamentalism 
may undermine the progress already made. But this chapter explained how a spiral of fear 
between Libya-Italy that culminated in a Libya-backed terrorist attack in Rome and a 
missile attack on Italy, became a spiral of hope through reassurance.  The argument that 
Italy benefited from the effects of U.S. compellence on Libya cannot be overlooked.  But 
internal affairs—namely domestic threats to Qadhafi’s regime—may have had a grea
 
240 “Italia Compensara a Libia la Epoca Colonial con 5000 Millones de Dolares, [Italy will 
Compensate Libya for the Colonial Era with 5000 million dollars,] Agence France Presse – Spanish, 30 
August 2008.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 8 March 2009. 
241 “Berlusconi to Address Libyan Parliament on Monday,” ANSA English Media Service, 2 March 
2009.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 11 March 2009. 
242 Ibid. 
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massive poverty that was fueling the domestic threats.  In sum, the two arguments—buck 
passing and reassurance—complement each other.  As Italy bypassed the more negative 
aspects of compellence, it was able to benefit from Libya’s isolation and Libya’s eventual 
concessions.  Meanwhile, a steady trend of trust-building signals brought about a period 
of rapprochement. Today, there is little sign of a reversal of this rapprochement.  
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V. CASE STUDY #3:  EXPLAINING THE IMPASSE BETWEEN 
COLOMBIA AND NICARAGUA 
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Figure 3.   Nicaragua-Colombia Area of Tensions (From: CIA World Factbook) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to the previous two chapters, this chapter explains a case where 
reassurance failed.  It involves the decades-long tense relations between Colombia and 
Nicaragua.  Ships from the Colombian and Nicaraguan Navies have been patrolling what 
03, 
ese waters.243  
f 
risdiction to rule on the disputed 
each country considers its territorial waters in the Western Caribbean Sea.  In 20
Colombia threatened to use force if Nicaragua began oil exploration in th
The tense situation took a turn for the worse in 2007, when the International Court o
Justice (ICJ, or World Court) ruled that it had the ju
                                                 
243 Javier Baena, “Colombia Threatens Force to Stop Nicaraguan Oil Exploration Near Disputed 
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ted was the 82nd meridian.244  Throughout 
2008, t
mbia 
did not  bled 
over in to an 
escalation of tensions due 249  
Considering
                                                
maritime boundary, which Colombia insis
he Nicaraguan Navy intercepted foreign fishing vessels in the area.245   At stake 
are the fishing and oil exploration rights in approximately 130,000 square kilometers of 
territorial waters.246  Also at stake is the growing tourism industry of the three largest 
islands in the archipelago—San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina.247   
Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the San Andres archipelago in 
1928.  However, since 1980, Nicaragua has insisted that it was forced to give up its claim 
to the islands under pressure from the United States, which occupied Nicaragua at the 
time of the agreement.248  In 2008, Nicaragua tried to reassure Colombia, but Colo
 reciprocate the signal.  Meanwhile, the Colombia-Nicaragua impasse has
to the recent diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuador, leading 
to President Daniel Ortega’s open support for the FARC.
 the current state of Colombia-Nicaragua tensions, why did Nicaragua’s 
signal of reassurance fail to bring rapprochement?  This chapter argues that Colombia 
and Nicaragua have failed to resolve their impasse because of deep mistrust, lack of 
diplomatic transparency, and ineffective multilateralism in their relations.  Furthermore, 
only one of the four proposed conditions was present at the time of Nicaragua’s signal. 
 
244 Resumen Jornada:  Colombia y Nicaragua Acogen con Satisfaccion Fallo de la Haya” [Daily 
Summary:  Colombia and Nicaragua Acknowledge with Satisfaction The Hague’s Ruling], Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 14 December 2007.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 31 March 2009. 
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 group seeks to overthrow the Colombian Government through a guerrilla insurgency. 
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245 “Nicaragua Captura Pesquero Hondureño con 81 Personas en Mar Caribe.” [Nicaragua Captures 
Honduran Fishing Vessel with 81 Aboard in Caribbean Sea].  Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Spanish), 
February 2008.  O
246 Yadira Ferrer, “Honduras-Nicaragua:  Colombia to Ratify Treaty.”  Newswire – Noticias en 
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247 The author has visited San Andres and can attest to the important economic incentive for 
Colombia to maintain sovereignty over the islands.   
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initial hree provinces, and the provincial 
admini
indeterminable inner or western boundary and to the Archipelago of San 
y.  Fearful of a 
British occupation, King Charles IV returned the islands to Nueva Granada in 1803.255 
                                                
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The origins of this dispute date to Spanish Colonial times.  After Colu
exploration, the region was divided into t
strations oversaw the Spanish conquest and colonization.  Starting in the 1700s, 
Great Britain began taking interest in the region.  The British began settling the Mosquito 
Coast (part of present day Nicaragua).250  They benefited from the lack of a supply route 
from the interior and began trading with the Miskito inhabitants.  King Phillip V of Spain 
responded by assigning the region to the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 with the 
hope that the viceroyalty could better protect the Spanish interests in the region.251  
Phillip V... gave her [New Granada] a right to the Mosquito Coast from 
Cape Gracias a Dios southward to Panama, with an indeterminate and 
Andres. . .252 
The “indeterminate and indeterminable border” mentioned in this charter would 
become the source of the present day dispute between Nicaragua, which was west of this 
indeterminate border, and Colombia, which was then part of Nueva Granada.  In 1786, 
Britain agreed to evacuate its colonizers from the Mosquito Coast and the “adjacent 
islands.”253 Sensing that the British threat had passed, the Spanish king transferred 
jurisdiction over the region back to the Captaincy-General of Guatemala.254  Guatemala 
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Napole  began seeking 
indepen
s claim to the Mosquito Coast in return for 
Nicarag
ra-Barcenas Meneses in 1928, which states, 
           
The King has decided that the San Andres Islands and the Area of the 
Costa de Mosquitos—from the Cabo Gracias a Dios to up to the Chagres 
River—be set apart from the Captaincy-General of Guatemala and to be 
dependent on the Viceroyalty of Santa Fe.256 
Britain’s threat to Spain diminished when the two kingdoms allied to
on in Europe.257  Meanwhile, the Latin American colonies
dence, and the ensuing revolutions soon reached the archipelago.  In 1822, the 
islands of San Andres and Providencia declared their “adherence to the [independent 
Colombian] Constitution of Cucuta.”258  In 1824, Colombia and the United Provinces of 
Central America agreed to honor the colonial boundaries established in 1803.259  In 1828 
Colombia agreed to recognize Nicaragua’
ua’s recognition of Colombian sovereignty over San Andres.260  
This agreement went unchallenged until 1903, when Panama declared its 
independence from Colombia.  Nicaragua considered that Panama’s independence voided 
Colombia’s sovereignty over San Andres.261  Nicaragua did not, however, challenge 
Colombia at that time, as it was preoccupied by a civil war that led to a U.S. invasion in 
1912.262  In 1925, during the U.S. occupation, President Carlos Solorzano submitted the 
claim to U.S. arbitration.263  U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg supported a 
reaffirmation of the 1828 agreement.264  Despite Solorzano’s opposition, both states 
ratified the Treaty of Esguer
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There is evidence that the U.S. lobbied for the treaty’s ratification, but not that it 
coerced
uninhabited coral cays north of San Andres that it had discovered in the 1800s.  
ormal protest, alleging that not only the cays, but the 
San An
Meneses Treaty on 5 February 1980.  In the words of Commander Daniel Ortega, 
                                                
The Republic of Colombia recognizes the full and entire sovereignty of 
the Republic of Nicaragua over the Mosquito Coast between Cape Gracias 
a Dios and the San Juan River and over Mangle Grande and Mangle Chico 
Islands in the Atlantic Ocean.  The Republic of Nicaragua recognizes the 
full and entire sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the islands of 
San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, 
islets and reefs forming a part of the San Andres Archipelago.265 
 the Nicaraguan Government into signing the agreement.266  In fact, the 
Nicaraguan Congress amended the treaty to include, “The archipelago of San Andres that 
is mentioned in the first article of this treaty does not extend to the west of the 82nd 
parallel of the Greenwich Meridian. . .”267 
The departure of the U.S. Marines in 1933 gave way to the Somoza Dynasty.  The 
San Andres issue was not raised again until 1972, when the U.S. ceded to Colombia three 
Nicaragua reacted to this by filing a f
dres Archipelago, constitute part of Nicaragua’s continental platform, and that 
according to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, all the islands in the region 
belonged to Nicaragua.268  In support of this claim, Somoza also denounced the 
Esguerra-Barcenas Meneses Treaty, stating: “the 1928 treaty was not ‘a manifestation of 
voluntary sovereignty.’”269 
In 1979, after a decades-long insurrection, the Sandinista Army overthrew 
Somoza.  One of the first acts of the new Junta was to renounce the Esguerra-Barcenas 
 
265 Curry Curtis and Patricia Curtis, “The Colombia-Nicaragua Dispute Over San Andres and 
Prov
egrams from Secretary Kellogg to Nicaraguan president Moncada in 1929 demonstrate 
the U favor of ratification.  See Zamora, Augusto, Intereses Territoriales de Nicaragua, 
(Ma Editorial de lo Jurídico, 1995), 84. 
 Ibid., 7. 
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olombian President Julio 
Cesar Turbay sent a naval task force of 500 Colombian Marines to San Andres.  An Air 
Force S
passe was suspended for a later date.272  
C. RECENT TENSIONS 
82nd 
meridia d the 
15th pa ragua 
and Co rallel 
as the duran 
troops On 7 
Decem protest with the ICJ against Colombia, arguing that the 
     
Historical circumstances since 1909 had prevented true defense of our 
continental shelf, jurisdictional waters and insular territories on the 
continental shelf.  The absence of sovereignty was manifested by the
imposition on our country of two treaties harmful to Nicaragua. . .the 
Barcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty, whose signing was imposed on 
Nicaragua in 1928 and whose ratification, also by force, occurred in 1930  
. . . both acts were effected under total political and military occupation of 
Nicaragua by the United States.270 
Within days of Ortega’s renunciation of the treaty, C
quadron was relocated to the San Andres Airport, and construction was hastened 
on a naval base.  Colombia also recalled its ambassador to Nicaragua.271  The situation 
remained tense until President Belisario Betancur succeeded Turbay in 1982.  Betancur’s 
strong opposition to the efforts by the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime won 
him praise by Ortega, and the San Andres im
Tensions peaked in 1999, when Colombia and Honduras agreed to the 
n as the east-west maritime border between Colombia and Nicaragua, an
rallel as the north-south maritime border between Honduras and both Nica
lombia.  Nicaragua quickly filed a protest with the ICJ, disputing the 15th pa
border with Honduras.  The Nicaraguan Army was placed on alert as Hon
were placed along the border.  Both countries were at the brink of war.273  
ber 2001, Nicaragua filed a 
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States had imposed the Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas.274 Colombia argue
on the treaty in the Nicaraguan Congress suggests a voluntary ratification.275
In May 2003, Nicaragua granted exploration rights in the Southwestern Caribbean 
to four U.S. oil companies.276  The Colombian defense minister threatened to use force if 
any of the exploration was to take place east of the 82nd meridian. T
bia confirmed that the area was not in its waters.277 
Tensions peaked again in 2007.  On 20 July, Colombia held its traditional 
Independence Day military parade in San Andres, triggering harsh rhetoric from Ortega:  
“The distance between Colombia and San Andres is like from here to the moon, 
compared to the distance to the Nicaraguan Coast, which is this close!  But President 
[Alvaro] Uribe came all the way here.”278   
On 13 December 2007, the ICJ pronounced its long-awaited ruling: 
The Court finds that the 1928 Treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua 
settled the matter of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, 
Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there is no extant legal dispute
between the Parties on that question, and that the Court thus can
jurisdiction over the question; the Court further finds that it has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute concerning sovereignty over the 
other maritime features claimed by the Parties and upon the dispute 
concerning the maritime delimitation ... As regards the question of the 
scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés Archipelago, the 
Court considers that the 1928 Treaty fails to provide answers as to which  
 
 Associated Press Worldstream, 12 May 2003.Obtained from www.nexis.com on 31 March 09.   
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 it is not 
accepting th
Tensions continued to escalate.  On 2 February 2008, in a speech given next to 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Ortega said “to touch Venezuela is to touch 
Nic er 
nd 
     
other maritime features form part of the Archipelago. The Court thus finds 
that the issue has not been settled . . . and that it has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon it.279 
The ruling favored Colombia by putting to rest the question of sovereignty over the San 
Andres archipelago.  But it did not resolve the question over the maritime border, 
mentioning that the 1928 treaty was not specific enough on the boundary.   
Ortega has used the ICJ ruling to protest Colombia’s continued enforcement of 
the status quo.  Immediately after the ruling, tensions escalated again, as Nicaraguan 
warships challenged Colombian vessels in the vicinity of the 82nd meridian.  On 26 
January 2008, Ortega accused Colombia of creating a “military tension because
e ICJ ruling and maintains a military vigilance in the maritime zone that it 
claims, but that is actually no longer a border in accordance with the ruling.”280   
Colombian President Uribe expressed in a 15 December 2007 Statement that “Colombia 
will continue to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Archipelago and the 
corresponding maritime areas…until they are modified by appropriate juridical 
instruments.”281  In other words, until the ICJ makes a final ruling on the maritime 
border, it would continue to recognize the 82nd meridian as the border.   
aragua, and vice versa.”282  On 10 February 2008, a Nicaraguan Navy command
declared that his country was not intimidated by the presence of at Colombian vessels a
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2008. 
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icaragua doubled its naval forces, declaring 
that it w 4 February, Uribe made 
conflic n navy seized two fishing 
essels had left 
t north of the 15th 
Nicaraguan waters. at four other vessels had been intercepted 
aircraft in the region.283  By 22 February, N
ould patrol the waters east of the 82nd meridian.284  On 1
an appeal to Colombian fishermen to avoid fishing west of the 82nd meridian to “avoid 
t with Nicaragua.”285  But on 9 March, the Nicaragua
vessels—one registered in the United States, the other in Honduras.  Both v
from San Andres and were fishing east of the 82nd meridian, bu
parallel, which, after the 2007 ICJ ruling between Nicaragua and Honduras, constituted 
286  It was later revealed th
by the Nicaraguan Navy near the 82nd meridian between February and March, but 
Colombia could not determine if the vessels had been intercepted in its waters.   
On 1 March 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC camp 2000 meters 
inside Ecuadorian territory.287  The successful attack, which killed a prominent FARC 
leader, was strongly condemned by Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.  Five days later, 
Ortega broke all relations with Colombia, arguing that for relations to be restored, it 
would be necessary for Colombia to “respect the ICJ ruling and not commit any more 
acts of terrorism like the one in Ecuador.”288  The militaries of Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Nicaragua were placed on alert.  The possibility of war was real. 
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ia, and Nicaragua (securitized). 
curitized). 
e 
security.”292  Nicaragua’s poor socioeconomic situation is crippling Ortega’s power.  The 
pressure is on him to deliver economic programs.  The San Andres region is not only a 
potentially helpful “cash cow” in terms of its growing tourism industry and promising 
     
D. SECURITIZED INTERESTS 
The following issues are security concerns for Colombia: 
 The threat of the FARC, and the support of the FARC by Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Boliv
 Sovereignty over the San Andres archipelago (se
 The Caribbean Tourism industry (highly politicized). 
 Economic ties with the United States and Central America, especially fre
trade (highly politicized). 
 Control over the Caribbean Sea drug trafficking routes (securitized). 
The first securitized issue is of particular concern to Colombia.  The alleged 
support by Colombia’s leftist neighbors is giving the weakened FARC a lifeline. In 2008, 
Colombia conducted a cross-border raid into Ecuador in which a FARC commander was 
killed.  With respect to the third issue, the rapid growth of Colombia’s Caribbean Coast 
(including San Andres) tourism industry has made the issue politicized.  Between January 
and October 2007 (just prior to the ICJ ruling), over 966,000 foreign citizens visited San 
Andres, over 100,000 more than in the same period in 2006.289   Fifty-six cruise ships, 
carrying over 70,000 tourists, visited San Andres, Cartagena, and Santa Marta in 2007.290  
Almost 6.5 million Colombian tourists visited San Andres between January and October 
2007, over 5% more than in the same period in 2006.291  Colombia does not want to see 
this trend interrupted; Nicaragua would like to take over this promising tourism industry. 
Nicaragua’s securitized issues are in line with Haftendorn’s argument that “most 
developing countries emphasize the economic, social, and domestic dimensions of 
                                            
289 Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, “Ingreso de Viajeros 
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critical.  The summ
joint patrols would ease tensions by “buying time” until the ICJ ruling was announced.295  
energy resources, but it is also a rallying cry similar to King Mohammed’s rally behind 
Morocco’s claim on Perejil.  Nicaragua’s pertinent securitized and politicized iss
 Fishing and oil exploration rights in the Western Caribbean Sea 
(securitized). 
 Nicaragua’s claim on San Andres (politicized). 
 Any threat to its alliance with Venezuela and Ecuador (securitized). 
 Economic ties with the United States and Central America (securitized). 
 Legacies of Nicaragua’s colonial past (securitized). 
E. THE SIGNAL OF REASSURANCE AND THE LACK OF RECIPROCATION 
A Rio Group Summit in the Dominican Republic in March 2008 provided an 
opportunity for a signal of reassurance.  The summit’s timing could not have been m
it took place three weeks after the Colombian raid inside Ecuador, and 
gave the presidents of the countries involved a chance to address the issue in front of the 
international media.  During the summit, Ortega demanded that Colombia withdraw its 
naval force from the 82nd meridian.  Uribe responded by offering to pull his forces back, 
but requested that both nations work on a mechanism whereby security would be 
safeguarded.293  Uribe mentioned that narco traffickers have used the sea-lanes near the 
82nd meridian and that this was the reason Colombia kept navy cruisers there.  On 7 
March, Ortega sent a signal of reassurance.  He invited Colombia to participate in joint 
anti-narcotics patrols in the vicinity of the 82nd meridian.294  On 11 March, during an 
internationally televised press conference, Ortega reiterated his offer, mentioning that 
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March, Ortega insisted that “Uri
supported 
the FARC, providing the group weapons (an 300
the Jul
blasted Ortega, and called for legal action against Nicaragua for supporting terrorism.  
Days a
But the next day, Ortega inspired distrust by declaring that Nicaragua had a right to a 200 
nautical mile “fishing zone” that included waters east of the 82nd meridian.296   
The signal of reassurance did not convince Colo
that Ortega’s offer was to conduct joint patrols east of the 82
e offer been to conduct joint patrols on the 82nd Meridian, the perception may 
een positive.  The day after Ortega’s petition, Colombian Foreign Minister 
do Araujo stressed, “while the ICJ resolves the border dispute that is today the 
eridian, the status quo that has existed for decades is to be maintained.”297  On 14 
be gave his word in front of the heads of state that were 
in the Dominican Republic.  He said he would withdraw his ships to San Andres.”298 
The joint patrols never took place.  Ortega’s insistence on promoting a fishing 
zone east of the 82nd meridian, and the capture of seven more fishing boats between 
January and April 2008, discouraged Colombia from cooperating.299  Ortega’s support of 
the FARC further fueled Colombia’s distrust.  In June, evidence from a laptop seized by 
the Colombian Army during its raid into Ecuador showed that Ortega actively 
issue since known as “FARC Gate”).   In 
y OAS Permanent Council Meeting, Colombian Ambassador Camilo Ospina 
fter the speech, Nicaraguan Government Minister Ana Isabel Morales announced 
that Nicaragua was no longer interested in the joint patrols and would not conduct them 
                                                 
296 “Colombia Ejercera Soberania en Caso de que Nicaragua Desconozca Limites,” [Colombia will 
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13 march 2008.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 8 May 2009. 
297 Ibid. 
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www  on 2 May 2009.  
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F. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
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until Colombia stop enforcing the 82nd meridian border.301  Not only was the signal not 
reciprocated, but it was withdrawn, violating the spirit of the “open-ended” undertone of 
hope outlined in Chapter II as necessary for reassurance. 
1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the we
the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to 
cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility 
cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that 
it wants to cooperate as well.  Once it does, the chances that the stronger state 
will reciprocate are high. 
This hypothesis is mostly supported in this case.  Nicaragua is clearly the weaker 
state.  But, Colombia has not demonstrated a willingness to cooperate because it feels that 
a signal of reassurance from Nicaragua is bait for exploitation.  After Ortega invited 
Colombia to carry out the joint patrols, Ortega declared an area east of the 82nd meridian 
a fishing zone for Nicaragua and began issuing licenses to fi
eed to the joint patrols, then how would the Colombian Navy react if any of its 
vessels spotted Nicaraguan-licensed vessels fishing east of the 82nd meridian? 
2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the 
chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime may 
encourage reciprocation. 
This hypothesis is supported in this case.  During the Rio Group Summit, the 
President of the Dominican Republic invited all the presidents to “finish this meeting with 
d a handshake.”302  At that point, in one of the most memorable moments in re
merican politics, Uribe stormed out of his seat, and went to Ecuadorean Pres
Correa and shook his hand.  Then he went over to Chavez and, amidst eup
e, hugged him. Then Ortega went over and hugged both leaders.303  At th
 
301 “Nicaragua no Quiere Patrullaje con Colombia, Dice Ministra Nicaraguense,” [Nicaragua Does 
not 
ined 
Want Patrol with Colombia, Says Nicaraguan Minister,] El Tiempo, 1 August 2008.  Obtained from 
www.eltiempo.com on 5 May 2009. 
302 Maria Elena Salinas, “Cumbre de la Conciliacion,” La Voz de Houston, 19 March 2008.  Obta
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s simmered.  The signal of reassurance that Ortega had announced earlier during that 
summit was not reciprocated.  The multilateral setting arguably prevented the tensions from 
escalating further.  Relations are certainly not better off, and a reassurance exchange has not 
occurred.  Other conditions likely overcame the positive elements of multilateralism.  
3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political 
rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more 
likely to be reciprocated. 
This case demonstrates an example where the reassurer is transparent about the 
opposite of what this hypothesis calls for.  Ortega’s behavior and political rhetoric do not 
inspire trust in Colombia.  Instead, Colombian leaders are convinced that Ortega’s 
rhetoric and actions are characteristic of an aggressor.  Nicaragua has been transparent in 
its intentions to act contrary to Colombia’s interests.  Nicaragua’s granting of asylum to 
FARC operatives and Ortega’s public support for the guerrilla group only increase the 
threat of a deeply securitized issue for Colombia.  Indeed, using the concepts outlined in 
Chapter II, deterrence is much more appropriate in this case. 
On 4 February 2008, almost two months after the ICJ ruling (and a month before 
Nicaragua’s signal of reassurance), Ortega asked a crowd of supporters
ther with the crowd “to Nicaragua!”  
Ortega may be using the dispute to rally his country in light of the staggering 
ic problems he faces.  The ICJ 
ctual San Andres Archipelago.  But Ortega tried repeatedly to “spin” the ruling. 
The island of San Andres was given to Colombia by the United States in 
1928 when they occupied Nicaragua.  [TheU.S.] gave away what wasn’t 
theirs. . .  The judgment states that the 82nd Meridian, which the 
Colombians claim to be the border with Nicaragua at sea, is not a border.  
They have had their ships there to prohibit Nicaraguans to fish in 
Nicaraguan waters, and they do not recognize what the ICJ dictated.305 
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so rationality behind 
Ortega’s rhetoric.  Nicaragua is facing staggering social and economic problems.  In 
00,000 fewer jobs than the average in the other Central 
Americ




This type of rhetoric demonstrates how Ortega uses the Neanderthal mentality to 
justify his actions against Colombia over San Andres.  But there is al
2007, Nicaragua generated 1
an countries.  That same year, inflation reached 16.88%, the highest in the 
region.306  Ortega’s popularity plunged from 64% during the first days of his 
administration, to 21% in 2007.307  The San Andres dispute gives Ortega an opportunity 
to distract the Nicaraguan people.  As Mohammed rallied the Moroccan people during the 
Perejil standoff, Ortega is trying to rally the Nicaraguan people behind his cause in the 
San Andres standoff.  The main difference is that Mohammed’s rhetoric was clearly 
defensive.  He never supported Spain’s enemies, such as ETA (which is comparable to 
the FARC in its mission), and although he was a friend of Chirac, France is 
istic with Spain as Venezuela is with Colombia.  It was much easier for 
Mohammed to reassure Spain of Morocco’s defensive intentions, than it is for Ortega to 
demonstrate any defensive intention towards Colombia.  The offer of joint patrols seemed 
to contradict Ortega’s other rhetoric involving the enforcement of alleged Nicaraguan 
sovereignty over its waters.  This is why Uribe didn’t “buy” the signal. 
4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as 
costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, 
then it is likely to reciprocate. 
Ortega’s offer to conduct joint patrols east on the 82nd meridian, and calling the 
waters “Nicaraguan,” is hardly a costly signal.  Ortega’s choice of words determ
t.  Had he offered to recognize the 82nd meridian as the border until the ICJ 
pronounced its ruling, then Colombia may have been reassured and possibly 
reciprocated.  The absence of this condition is probably the strongest reason as to why 
reassurance failed.  Colombia perceived Ortega’s offer as more of a trick whereby 
Nicaragua would attempt to advance its position at the expense of Colombia’s.  
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Ni a y 
of its securitized interests (e.g., ending its support for the FARC).   
G. CONCLUSION 
During the height of the tensions with Colombia, members from Ortega’s party 
called for Ortega’s resignation.  Rising food and fuel prices sparked riots and strikes by 
truck drivers.308  Politicians demanded that Ortega focus more on Nicaragua’s problems 
and less on the San Andres issue. Meanwhile, the English speaking Miskitos demanded 
more autonomy, and even threatened secession.309  Ortega’s strategy of linking the San 
Andres issue with the FARC backfired.  In May 2008, the opposition blasted Ortega for 
granting asylum for the survivors of the Colombian raid in Ecuador.  The “FARC-Gate” 
scandal has plagued Ortega with more domestic and international problems. 
This case study demonstrated a situation where a signal of reassurance was not 
reciprocated because the signal failed to convince the reassuree that the reassurer had 
defensive intentions.  By not respecting the status quo until the ICJ makes its final ruling 
on a maritime border, Nicaragua was acting aggressively.  A signal of reassurance needed 
thermore, 
 undermined a different securitized issue to a greater 
extent than the joint patrols could have enhanced Colombia’s position in the narco 
trafficking threat.
caragu  did not offer any concessions that would increase Colombia’s position in an
to demonstrate a willingness to accept the status quo until the ruling.  Fur
Ortega’s support for the FARC
  Finally, although multilateralism was a factor, and the weaker state 
tried to reassure first, the signal was not costly enough to reassure Colombia.   
Most experts do not venture to predict which way the ICJ will rule.  Given 
Ortega’s challenges at home, it is likely he will continue to use the San Andres dispute as 
a rallying cry for support.  If Nicaragua wins maritime territory in this dispute, Ortega 
will claim a victory.  If the Court rules to uphold the border at the 82nd meridian, Ortega 
will then continue to demand that Colombia “return” San Andres, as he has since the 
1970s.  Given the current relationship, and the fallout over Nicaragua’s support of the 
FARC, it is unlikely that relations will improve until Ortega is out of office. 
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VI. CASE STUDY #4:  EXPLAINING THE CYPRUS IMPASSE 
 
Figure 4.   Cyprus Area of Tensions (From:  CIA World Factbook) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The tense relationship between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus highlights 
the challenges to a successful reassurance strategy.  Since Cyprus’ independence in 1960, 
there has been an atmosphere of social and political tension between the island’s ethnic 









n Turkish troops entered the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots after a military
coup against the Cypriot Government that was backed by the military junta in Greece.
The intervention resulted in a de facto partition of the island.  The ensuing tens
the Greek Cypriots and their ally Greece at the brink of war against Turkey and th
kish Cypriots on several occasions.  In 1998, tensions peaked over a shipment of 
Russian S-300 missiles to Cyprus.  In an effort to improve Cyprus’ international stan
bow to Greece’s preferences, and reassure the Turkish Cypriots, the Cypriot Preside
ordered that the missiles be diverted to Crete.  Although the move kept tensions f
 84
 85
t a rapprochement among the 
Cyprio
1960, roughly 80 % of the population was ethnic Greek, and 18 % ethnic Turkish.   
  In 1915, Britain offered Greece enosis in exchange for 
Greece’s support during World War I.  The Greek king declined and declared a position 
of neut
pursue enosis, while the Turkish Cypriots felt that they were an endangered minority that 
escalating further, the Turkish Cypriots did not feel reassured and did not reciprocate the 
signal.  Why did signals of reassurance fail to bring abou
ts?  This chapter concludes that while signals of reassurance kept the tensions in 
Cyprus from spiraling into war, they were not perceived as costly enough to bring about a 
meaningful rapprochement.   
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
For centuries, the people of Cyprus enjoyed long periods of autonomy with 
sporadic interventions by outside powers. When Cyprus became an independent state in 
310
The Turks were descendants of immigrants who arrived during the Ottoman Empire’s 
300-year rule.  The ethnic Greeks had constantly resisted Ottoman rule, and from their 
revolts emerged a Greek Cypriot identity.311  British colonization of Cyprus began in 
1878, as British troops sought a naval post in the Eastern Mediterranean.312  Greek 
Cypriots were hopeful that Britain would eventually allow for the island’s annexation by 
Greece (better known as enosis).
rality.313  After the war, Turkey recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus in the 
Treaty of Lausanne.314 The Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, continued to 
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ey renounced its claims over many regions of the Middle East, as well as 




313 “British Annexation” section in Eric Solsten ed., Cyprus:  A Country Study (Washington:  G
ibrary of Congress, 1991).  Obtained from http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/ on 12 October 2009. 
314 The Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allied Powers formally demarcated the borders 
of the Republic of Turkey, and settled the status of Greek citizens living in Turkey and Turkish citizens 
living in Greece.  In addition, Turk
ds in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, including Cyp
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l a “buffer zone” between the two 
commu
required British protection.315 By 1960, tensions escalated amidst a reemergence of the 
Greek Cypriot insurgency—this time against British rule.  
Although Cyprus was declared independent on 16 August 1960, its sovereignty 
was constrained by three treaties.  First, “the Treaty of Guarantee forbade secession or the 
union of Cyprus with any other state.”316  In addition, it granted Greece, Turkey, and 
Britain the right to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus if any of these three countries felt that 
the status quo was being threatened.317  Second, the Treaty of Alliance (which was never 
implemented) sought a tripartite military force in Cyprus composed of Greek and Turkish 
troops.  Finally, the Treaty of Establishment gave the U.K. the right to maintain two 
military bases on the island.318  The fragile peace achieved in 1960 did not last long.  In 
1963, Turkish Cypriots, led by Rauf Denktash, withdrew their participation in 
government.319  Communal fighting ensued, but in December, the guarantor states 
brokered a cease-fire.  The U.K. agreed to provide 2,700 troops to maintain order in the 
most “sensitive” towns and agreed to patro
nities.320 UN forces replaced the British in 1964, and have since patrolled what is 
now called the “Green Line.”321 
In May 1967, the Greek military overthrew the civilian government in Athens.322  
The junta was sympathetic to enosis, and began supplying troops and arms to the Greek 
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with 30,000 troops.  The coup quickly collapsed, as did the military regime in Athens.  
Makario es.331  
ek Cypriots were displaced to the southern portion of the 
islan fuge in the occupied area of the 
                             
Cypriot Nationalists.  In November, without Makarios’ authorization, Greek Cypriot 
forces under the command of General Gregorios Grivas attacked a Turkish Cypriot 
enclave near Larnaca, killing 28 Turkish Cypriots.323  When Turkey threatened to invade 
the island in retaliation, Makarios appealed to the Soviet Union.324 U.S. President 
Lyndon Johnson warned that NATO would not support Turkey if an invasion triggere
 Soviet reaction.325  Turkey stood down.  Tensions escalated again when Grivas, 
who was exiled after the 1964 incident, was allowed back in Cyprus in 1971.326  His 
death three years later emboldened the nationalist cause.  “Thousands attended the 
funeral of the old warrior, chanting slogans of enosis.”327  Nicos Sampson succeeded 
Grivas, and continued leading the cause for enosis.328  Concerned at the Greek meddling 
in Cyprus, Makarios broke relations with the junta.  In a letter to the media, Makarios 
wrote, “I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases touched, a hand invisibly 
extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence.  For the sake of 
national expedience, however, I kept silent.”329  
One week later, that “invisible hand” became visible.  On 15 July 1974, Sampson 
led a coup d’état that overthrew Makarios.330 Five days later, Turkey invade
s returned to Cyprus after a brief tenure by Vice President Glafcos Clerid
Hundreds of thousands of Gre
d, while thousands of Turkish Cypriots sought re
                    
rowiec, Cyprus:  A Troubled Island, 69–70.  Grivas was Greek officer born in Cyprus, 
and led t priot cause for enosis, or reunification with Greece. 
, Cyprus:  The Search for a Solution, 3. 
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north.332 The UN Security Coun
ing “an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of 
Cyprus.”333  Turkey disregarded the resolution, and sent 5,000 farmers to the occupied 
area in an effort to enlarge the Turkish community in Cyprus.  Meanwhile, Makarios and 
Clerides began a massive armament plan to deter the Turks from further invasion.334  
In an effort to de-escalate tensions, Makarios acceded to Denktash’s demand in 
1977 that any negotiations lead to an “independent, nonaligned, bi-communal federal 
republic.”335 Makarios died on 3 August 1977, but his successor, Spiros K
ed the negotiations two years later.336  In 1983, the UN General Assembly “voted 
that Turkey should remove its troops from Cyprus.”337  Denktash responded by declaring 
the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).338  On 18 
November 1983, the UNSC passed resolution 541, which “deplores the declaration of the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus” 
and “calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of 
Cyprus.”339  The ensuing isolation of the north denied the Turkish Cypriots the 
opportunity to benefit from the prosperity that was taking place in the south.340 
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C. RECENT TENSIONS 
The Greek Cypriot government pursued an aggressive armament agenda during 
the 1990s. By 1996, Cyprus had acquired “100 French-made AMX-30 tanks, 124 Russian 
341armo  200 Greek-made Leonidas personnel carriers.”   In 1993, Greek 
Minister Andreas Papandreou and Cypriot President Clerides signed a defense 
 which bound Greece to d
of the Green Line.342  In 1995, Turkey purchased 150 U.S. ATACM missiles.343  Cyprus 
responded by requesting that Greece install anti-missile defenses on the island.  
Tensions escalated in 1996, when the European Motorcycle Federation staged a 
protest along the Green Line.  Despite warnings by the Cypriot authorities to not cross 
into the TRNC, many motorcyclists entered the buffer zone and met Turkish nationalists 
who were waiting for them.344  Widespread fighting ensued.  In one episode, three 
Turkish Cypriot policemen beat Greek Cypriot Tassos Isaac to death.  The beating was 
captured on video and replayed throughout the world.345  Hundreds attended Isaac’s 
funeral, triggering new unrest.  In one protest, Isaac’s cousin, Solomo
shot dead by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces as he tried to take down
on the TRNC side of the border.346  The unrest brought the two sides to the brin
SECURITIZED INTEREST
Tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots involve around four m
issues:  governance, security, property, and territory.347  For the Republic of Cyprus,
following issues have been securitized: 
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oops on the island (securitized). 
351 Because of this 
disparit
 The presence of some 35,000 Turkish tr
 The claim to private property by Greek Cypriots displaced in the 1974 
Turkish intervention (politicized).348 
 Reunification with under one sovereign state (securitized). 
 The naturalization of some, and the deportation of other, Turkish “settlers” 
in Northern Cyprus, estimated between 35,000 and 100,000 
(politicized).349 
The Turkish Cypriots are concerned that reunification will endanger their 
community.  To many, “division has solved the Cyprus problem.  Today, they say, 
Cyprus is an island of two separate communities where the minority Turks are no longer 
subject to attacks and discrimination.”350  Many Turkish Cypriot politicians prefer that 
the island remain divided, and that the international community recognize a sovereign 
TRNC.  However, many Turkish Cypriots are aware that the TRNC’s economic situation 
sharply contrasts with the prosperity of the Republic of Cyprus.
y, many support reunification in order to reap the benefits of Cyprus’ economy 
and EU membership.  The Turkish Cypriots’ securitized issues include: 
 The economic isolation of Northern Cyprus (securitized). 
 The permanence of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee  (securitized). 
 The autonomy and sovereignty of the area that encompasses the TRNC 
(politicized).352 
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eployment in Cyprus.”355  Russia warned 
Turkey ld be 
conside yprus 
televisi ete 
demilit n the 
Cyprus rrive, 
we wil d.”358  
The sta e rmined to prevail. 
      
E. REASSURANCE NOT RECIPROCATED 
In 1997, Cyprus was spending an estimated $2 million a day on armaments.353  
One purchase involved a shipment of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.354 Russia’
cement of the sale in January 1997 drew criticism from the United States and 
condemnation from Turkey.  In fact, Turkey threatened to conduct a preemptive strike on 
the shipments “to prevent the missiles’ d
 that any attack on Russian or Greek ships carrying the missiles wou
red a “casus belli.”356  Russian Ambassador Georgi Muradov told C
on that the missiles would be shipped unless there was a “compl
arization between the two Cypriot communities or progress was reached i
 peace talks.”357  Meanwhile, Denktash announced, “if the S-300 missiles a
l announce to the world that all talks on Cyprus have come to a complete en
ndoff amounted to a “spiral of fear,” as both sides seemed d te
Turkey’s warnings and Russia’s counter warnings continued throughout 1998. 
The EU also became involved when Austrian Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schussel, 
remarked in late 1998, “the EU and its member states would simply not understand it if 
Clerides proceeded with this deployment when accession negotiations were under way 
and efforts were being made to achieve a Cyprus settlement before accession.”359  The 
implication had a profound effect, in that it brought the dispute to the forefront of 
Cyprus’ accession talks.  Meanwhile, Turkey’s accession talks had explicitly become 
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ward off the threat 
of Turkish m 363
decision.364  One independent newspaper declared, “Greece and Cyprus had made a 
‘hu ating climb-down’ in the face of pressure from the United States.”365  Instead of 
the s troops in 
contingent on “supporting the UN-led negotiations on a Cyprus settlement.”360  In all, the 
EU’s involvement made Cyprus sensitive to EU demands to cancel the missile shipments, 
while making Turkey defiant to EU demands to stop threatening a preemptive strike.361 
Clerides’ fateful decision to divert the missiles came during a visit to Athens in 
late December 1998.  In his book, published in 2007, Clerides recounts his meeting w
Prime Minister Kostantinos Simitis: 
I spoke for about 30 minutes, explaining the reasons for which the missiles 
had to be transported to Cyprus… …After my detailed explanations, 
Simitis spoke giving the reasons for which the Greek government was 
against the transportation of the S-300s…My suggested 
compromise...[was] that the missiles would be moved to Crete…I 
mentioned that I was ready as the President of the Cypriot Democracy to 
take on the responsibility of the non-transportation of the missiles to 
Cyprus because I didn’t want to jeopardize the excellent relationship that 
both Greece and Cyprus had achieved with a lot of efforts.362 
In addition to honoring the Greek request, Clerides also wanted to salvage the 
peace negotiations with Denktash, and felt that the diversion would “
ilitary intervention.”   But the signal was politically costly.  Several 
ministers in Clerides’ coalition resigned, while most Greek Cypriots disagreed with the 
mili
quid pro quo that the Russians had implied before (Turkey withdraws it
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ing until a 
settlem e new 
round o e EU 
accepte
 1999, a massive earthquake devastated Turkey, killing at least 
15,000.
exchange for the abandonment of the missile plan), Turkey got its way without making a 
concession.366  Instead of reciprocating, Turkey’s foreign minister Ismail Cem called the 
decision “unacceptable” and stated, “If anyone reckons that Turkey is now going to give 
in to blackmail over this plan to deploy these missiles outside Cyprus, they are very much 
mistaken…This would exacerbate the tension between two neighboring countries.”367 
The missiles were paid for and stored in Crete until 2007.368  Although the spiral 
of fear had been halted, Turkey and the TRNC did not reciprocate the signal.  
Nevertheless, the international community was encouraged. The G-8 addressed the 
Cyprus dispute at the June 1999 Cologne-Bonn Summit and laid the groundwork for 
UNSC Resolution 1218.369  The resolution called for Secretary General Annan to use his 
good offices to broker new negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC 
“without preconditions, all issues on the table, a commitment of continu
ent is reached, and full consideration of all UN resolutions in effect.”370  Th
f negotiations would eventually produce the “Annan Plan.”  In addition, th
d Cyprus’ formal application for accession on 4 July 1999.371 
In August
372  Greece immediately offered aid and technical expertise.373  Three weeks 
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particular) contingent on this demand.376  Despite Turkish objections, the Summit’s final 
declara
 to demand the recognition 




                                                
later, an earthquake struck Athens, killing 140.  The Turkish Government was quick to 
reciprocate by sending its rescue experts.  “Television scenes of Turkish rescue experts 
searching for victims trapped in the rubble of a collapsed factory in Athens underlined the 
shift in attitudes from mutual distrust to unstinting cooperation.”374 Delegations from the 
two countries began meeting to discuss earthquake recovery.  They eventually
ing Cyprus.  Many thought that Greek-Turkish rapprochement would spread to 
Cyprus. But as talks got under way, Denktash continued to demand that the TRNC be 
recognized.375  Meanwhile, the European Council met in Helsinki to consider new 
candidates.  Greece insisted that no preconditions be attached to Cyprus’ accession, and 
practically made its support for any EU enlargement (and Turkey’s candidacy
tion with regard to Cyprus was a clear victory for the Greek Cypriots. 
The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate 
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.  If no settlement has been 
reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the council’s 
decision on accession will be made without the above being a 
precondition.  In this case the Council will take account of all-relevant 
factors.377 
As talks continued through 2003, Denktash continued
emi-autonomous states on the island.378 This was unacceptable to the Greek 
ts, who reminded the negotiators that Denktash himself obtained a Greek Cypriot 
ion to a one-state federation in 1977.379  Denktash also felt that the TRNC should 
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taken at the 10-11 March 
ible to reach agreement to  put 
 of Cyprus and as a consequence it will not be 
 EU along with Turkey instead of Cyprus.380  Although Denktash was reelected 
0, his views on EU accession began to cost him support among the Turkish 
ts, who increasingly preferred reunification if it meant EU membership.381  It was 
clear that a lack of international recognition was devastating the TRNC’s economy, and 
that reunification with the Greek Cypriots would be the only way out of the crisis.382  
After 54 face-to-face meetings, 150 bilateral meetings, 192 pages of agreed-text, 
6,000 more pages of draft, all costing over $3 million, Denktash pulled out of the 
working group in early 2003 over his reluctance to put the Annan Plan to a 
referendum.383  When Denktash walked out, the frustration was enormous. The Security 
Council demonstrated its frustration when it unanimously approved Resolution 1475. 
[Third Paragraph—the Security Council] Regrets that, as described in the 
Secretary General’s report, due to the negative approach of the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, culminating in the position  
2003 meeting in The Hague, it was not poss
the plan to simultaneous referenda as suggested by the Secretary-General, 
and thus that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have been 
denied the opportunity to decide for themselves on a plan that would have 
permitted the reunification
possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement before 16 April 2003.384 
F. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
1.  A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and 
the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to 
cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility 
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382 The economic disparity between Cyprus and the TRNC was most pronounced during this period 
(1999–2000).  While the Greek Cypriot economy was growing on average 5%, Denktash was 
contemplating imposing a state of emergency in order to handle the economic crisis in the TRNC. – Janet 
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When C or 
TRNC 
standing, and probably helped undo the “link” between the requirement for a settlement 
and the possibility of EU accession.  
cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that 
it wants to cooperate as well.  Once it does, the chances that the stronger state 
will reciprocate are high. 
This condition is not present in this case, but it is possible to infer indirect support 
for the hypothesis.  This analysis identified two signals of reassurance, but they were sent 
by the stronger state, the Republic of Cyprus.385   Makarios’ 1977 concession to allow 
for a federated, bi-zonal state was an attempt to reassure the Turkish Cypriots, who felt 
that reunification would endanger their political autonomy.  The TRNC did not 
reciprocate this signal.  The S-300 missile diversion to Crete was another signal of 
reassurance, and was not reciprocated either.  The fact that the Greek Cypriot side was 
willing to send signals of reassurance suggests that had the TRNC sent the first signal of 
reassurance, the Republic of Cyprus would have likely reciprocated, resulting in a likely 
rapprochement.  In other words, had the weaker party initiated reassurance, its efforts 
would likely have been reciprocated, consistent with the proposition. 
2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the 
chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime may 
encourage reciprocation. 
This condition is supported in this case.  The EU and the UN were instrumental in 
keeping the Cypriot standoff from escalating into war.  However, only Turkey—
rnational organization—had any real influence over Denktash and the TRNC.  
lerides ordered the diversion of missiles to Crete, the expectations for Turkish 
reciprocation were high.  However, Turkey’s continued hard line stance surprised 
the international community.386  Nevertheless, the move helped Cyprus’ international 
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uld make a weak TRNC much weaker.  Since this has not happened, and since the Republic 
of C
8.  
w.nexis.com on 20 November 2009. 
yprus acted unilaterally in diverting the S-300 missiles, this condition was not met in this case.  
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er side perceives the other’s intentions as 
benign.  The Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots want to eliminate, or at least 
rkish Cypriot population.  The Greek Cypriots feel that the 
Turkish
3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through  political 
rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more 
likely to be reciprocated. 
This condition is not fulfilled in this case, which is more an example of the 
difficulties posed by the security dilemma.387 Robert Jervis explains that “While an 
understanding of the security dilemma and psychological dynamics will dampen some 
arms-hostility spirals, it will not change the fact that some policies aimed at security will 
threaten others.”388  In the case of Cyprus, neith
politically subordinate, the Tu
 invasion and the presence of Turkish troops are indicative of an offensive 
intention.  With regard to the possible scenarios for reassurance explained in Chapter II, 
this case points to a scenario in which reassurance is unlikely to succeed.  Instead, a 
deterrence policy is more appropriate until both sides send signals costly enough to 
change their perceptions.  Political statements, such as Turkish Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit’s rhetoric that “there are two completely independent states [in Cyprus],” and 
Denktash’s demands for equal recognition as a head of state, cannot be reconciled with 
calls by the Greek Cypriots for reunification under Greek Cypriot leadership. 389 
4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as 
costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, 
then it is likely to reciprocate. 
This condition is not met in this case, and possibly had the greatest impact in the 
outcome of Clerides’ attempt to reassure the TRNC.  The signals between the Republic of 
                                                 
387 The security dilemma is a commonly used term in political science, and refers to a situation where 
security-seeking states are faced with the daunting task of correctly interpreting other states’ intentions 
(dilemma of perception), and deciding on how to react to those perceptions (dilemma of response).  A good 
expl , 
ots 
 31 October 1999, World Section.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 10 
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anation of this term can be found in Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma:  Fear
Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).  
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University Press, 1976), 76.  The S-300 missile crisis underlines illustrates this assertion.  The missiles 
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 divert the S-300 missiles, were costly 
signals
The fifth iteration of the Annan Plan was submitted to both Cypriot communities 
in Apr
% of the 
Greek assos 
Papado n the 
negotia t been 
negotia o the 
expecta tification, while 
Turkish
Cyprus and the TRNC were not costly enough for meaningful reassurance.  To the Greek 
Cypriots, Makarios’ 1977 concession to allow reunification under a federation 
arrangement, as well as Clerides’ 1998 decision to
.  But as perceived by the Turkish Cypriots, the costs mainly involved domestic 
political criticism in the Republic of Cyprus rather than any significant constraint on 
Greek Cypriot military capabilities.  As a result, the Turkish Cypriots did not send any 
costly signals in return.  A complete Turkish troop withdrawal may be the costly signal 
required for a successful reassurance exchange. 
G. CONCLUSION 
il 2004.  The incentives associated with EU membership swayed a majority of 
Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of the Annan Plan in April 2004.390  But 76
Cypriots voted “no” in their referendum.391  Cypriot President T
poulos, who defeated Clerides in 2003 by pledging less flexibility i
tions, rejected eleven “last minute” Turkish Cypriot demands that had no
ted at the proximity talks.392  Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots objected t
tion of rebuilding the north’s economy immediately following ra
 Cypriot obligations had no deadline.393  Several days after the vote, the Republic 
of Cyprus was admitted into the EU and the TRNC was officially exempted from the 
EU’s acquis communautaire.394  In response, the TRNC opened all checkpoints along the 
Green Line.  Although there were no incidents along the border (contrary to Denktash’s 
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Affa
ore years, “the permission to allow 650 
Tur  to remain in Cyprus [indefinitely], and a Turkish ‘right of intervention.’” - Costas 
Mel Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and 
Eur
 Defense and Foreign 
Affa
Hannay, Cyprus:  The Search for a Solution, 220–221. 
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irs Daily, 9 April 2004.  Obtained from www.nexis.com on 22 November 2009. These demands 
include allowing Turkish troops to remain on the island for 14 m
kish troops
pides, “ako
o-Turkish Relations,” Mediterranean Quarterly 17:1 (Winter 2006), 86 (71–101). 
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warnings), the soc c ssed firsthand the 
economic prosperity of the Greek Cypriot side.395  Since then, some 10,000 Turkish 
For many politicians, division is an acceptable solution to the dispute. Former 
urkish Prime M nt Ece 1999, believ ious 
sts on rus.  Before  Turkish acti  1974, there  
he isl either genocide against the Turks or fractional c ts between 
ps.  Since then, there has been uninterrupted peace.”397  Others 
on the Greek Cypriot side maintain that division is unacceptable, but will have to accept 
In all, a costly signal—preferably from the TRNC—is required in order for a 
meanin
ial sho k was enormous, as Turkish Cypriots witne
Cypriots have found employment in the south.396 
T inister Bule vit said in  “we don’t e that a ser
problem exi  Cyp  the on in  was a constant
conflict on t and— onflic
the different Greek grou
it for now, given the cost of reunification.   
gful reassurance exchange to begin.  Author Thomas Streissguth writes, 
The Greek Cypriots cannot expect cooperation from the Turkish side if 
they continue their economic blockade, ridicule the political and economic 
institutions of the TRNC, and limit the travel of foreign tourists to the 
Turkish sector…Turkey could afford a major gesture by reducing its large 
military contingent in Northern Cyprus.  That might show good will, 
reassure the Greek Cypriots who live in constant fear of Turkey—and 
perhaps induce them to spend less on sophisticated weaponry.398  
Other necessary and costly signals involve securitized interests: allowing Turkish 
Cypriots to relocate freely in the Greek Cypriot side, halting Turkish settlements in the 
north, and incorporating both the Greek and Turkish languages in school curricula.399  
Only a costly signal will break a “spiral of fear” with a “peace initiative.”  Until then, 
deterrence will continue to be the only effective way to avoid war. 
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VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMATION AND CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 Condition #1 Condition #2 Condition #3 Condition #4 
Case Study 1 YES NO YES INCONCLUSIVE 
Case Study 2 YES YES YES YES 
Case Study 3 YES YES NO NO 
Case Study 4 NO YES NO  NO 
Table 1.   The presence of the four conditions in each case study 
ditions gathered from the literature review, 
reassur
f reassurance was not reciprocated, this condition was not 
This thesis sought to describe reassurance as a process in which one state sends a 
signal that enhances an adversary’s position in an issue that it has deemed vital to its 
security.  If the signal is successful, the adversary will reciprocate, sending the reassurer 
another signal that enhances a securitized issue for the reassurer.  The end goal is to build 
trust through reassurance.  But on many occasions, signals of reassurance have been 
ignored, misinterpreted, or even exploited.  The research question of this thesis is:  
“under what conditions is a signal of reassurance reciprocated?”  The logical framework 
behind this thesis posits that of the four con
those present in the two case studies where a signal of reassurance was reciprocated (case 
study 1 and case study 2), and not present in the case studies where a signal of 
ance was not reciprocated (case study 3 and case study 4), are the most likely to 
have a major impact on the success or failure of reassurance.  In accordance with the 
findings, the conditions are evaluated below, in rank order according to logical relevance. 
Condition #3: If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through 
political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is 
more likely to be reciprocated. 
This condition fares strongest in this project.  In the two case studies where a 
signal of reassurance was reciprocated, this condition was present.  In the two case 
studies where a signal o
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present
 curbing illegal immigration to Italy, its change of policy regarding 
interna
amely its active 
intervention against fishing vessels near San Andres, and Turkey’s actions in Cyprus 
nal 
costly, then it is likely to reciprocate. 
.  In the positive cases, government officials from both Morocco and Libya (the 
respective “reassurers”) met numerous times with the respective “reassurees” (Spain and 
Italy) and expressed their defensive intentions.  In the case of Morocco, its concerns 
regarding domestic terrorism, its willingness to participate in CBMs, and its willingness 
to cooperate with Spain in the fisheries and immigration issues reassured Spain and 
encouraged it to reciprocate, namely with regard to EU-Morocco relations, the Western 
Sahara issue, and infrastructure projects.  In the case of Libya, its willingness to 
cooperate on
tional terrorism, and its removal of its decades-long restriction on Italian settlers 
reassured Italy and encouraged it to reciprocate, namely with regard to energy purchases, 
compensation for colonial atrocities, and international support. 
In the negative cases, this condition was not present.  On the contrary, both 
Nicaragua and the TRNC kept their rhetoric antagonistic.  Their postures were perceived 
as offensive the other side.  Daniel Ortega constantly called for the “return” of San 
Andres, and Denktash constantly called for the TRNC’s recognition as an independent 
state.  The Nicaraguan Navy’s actions in the Caribbean Sea, n
were not perceived by Colombia or the Republic as Cyprus as defensive.  Therefore, any 
signal of reassurance was not reciprocated.   
Condition #4:  A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is 
perceived as costly.  In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s sig
This condition has the second strongest logical relevance to the research question.  
In neither of the conditions where reassurance was not reciprocated was the signal costly 
enough for the other side to reciprocate.  In the case of Nicaragua, its signal was not 
perceived as costly.  On the contrary, Colombia perceived Nicaragua’s offer to conduct 
joint patrols a trick to legitimize their presence in Colombian waters.  In the case of 
Cyprus, the TRNC and Turkey considered Cyprus’ diversion of the S-300 missiles 
“blackmail” and a trick to obtain the demilitarization of the island without making a more 
meaningful concession.   
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 essence, there is a new conclusion to be made, that small signals not 
considered costly can lead to more costly reciprocal signals, especially if other conditions 
ase of Libya, there is little doubt that the surrender of the Lockerbie 
terroris
er state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince 
h a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well.  
Once it
s in both cases (Spain and Italy) 
made strong efforts to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate, be it with political 
toric
#3, the weaker state (Nicaragua) also attempted to reassure first.  But in this case, the 
In the first case study, this thesis concludes that the cost of Morocco’s signal of 
reassurance cannot be determined.  Allowing Spanish fishermen to fish in Moroccan 
waters was not a costly signal.  But the signal led to more costly signals of reassurance, 
such as Spain’s support of favorable EU economic policies towards Morocco, Moroccan 
acceptance of Western Saharan autonomy, and Moroccan cooperation in curbing illegal 
immigration.  In
are present.   
In the c
ts to the International Court of Justice was a costly signal.  Arguments can be 
made that this signal was more a result of compellence or positive inducements.  But 
Premier Qadhafi’s decision was also based on political calculations.  He knew that this 
was a signal that would reassure the world and possibly end Libya’s isolation.  His 
decision to hand over the terrorists essentially meant that he gave up leverage in the 
hopes that his action would be rewarded.  It was.  Italy was the first country to resume 
full diplomatic and economic relations after Libya’s signal.   
Condition #1:  A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state 
reassures first.  If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the 
stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then 
the burden is on the weak
the stronger state, throug
 does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high. 
Although this condition is ranked third, it is about as logically relevant to the 
research question as Condition #4.  In the two case studies where the signal of 
reassurance was reciprocated, the reassuring states (Morocco and Libya) were also the 
weaker of the two adversaries.  In addition, the reassuree
rhe , or economic incentives, or pressure for international cooperation.  In Case study 
signal was not costly, and its intentions were not benign.  On the contrary, Ortega’s 
rhetoric was frequently hostile.  This is why this condition is ranked third.  The other two 
 103
reciprocation of a 
reassur
ght of stiff resistance by Scandinavian countries to EU economic 
concessions to Morocco. 
th cases where a signal of reassurance was 
not rec
 a reassurer must convince the reassuree that it does not 
seemed to have more influence on this outcome than this condition.  Finally, in the 
Cyprus case, the weaker state is the TRNC, and there is little evidence to indicate that it 
has ever sent a signal of reassurance to the stronger Republic of Cyprus.  The evidence 
from the case strongly suggests that, had the weaker party attempted reassurance, the 
gesture would have been reciprocated, thus indirectly supporting the hypothesis reflected 
in condition #1. 
Condition #2: Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase 
the chances for reciprocity.  Other members of an international regime may encourage 
reciprocation. 
This condition has the least logical relevance to the research question.  The case 
studies have shown that a potential for multilateralism to encourage the 
ance signal exists.  But in general, multilateralism has been ineffective and in 
some instances more of a hindrance in aiding a reassurance exchange.  In the first case 
study (Morocco reassures Spain and Spain reciprocates), multilateralism hindered Spain’s 
efforts to reassure Morocco in terms of EU economic policy because some EU members 
expressed concern at Morocco’s human rights record.  Instead of helping Spain 
reciprocate Morocco’s signal of reassurance, the EU’s involvement hindered Spain.  
Even France, Spain’s economic and political rival with respect to the Maghreb, supported 
Spain’s efforts in li
In the third and fourth case studies (bo
iprocated), the involvement of multilateral organizations—namely the UN, OAS, 
and EU—was ineffective at encouraging the reassurees to reciprocate signals of 
reassurance.  Only in the second case (Libya reassures Italy and Italy reciprocates) was 
multilateralism a positive factor in the positive outcome. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATION 1:  THE REASSURER MUST DEMONSTRATE 
THAT IT DOES NOT WANT TO EXPAND 
In addition to the conclusions presented in the previous section, this thesis has 
found other relevant conclusions that carry policy implications.  The first of these 
additional conclusions is that
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want to
lonizers.  Only 
when M
egates its potential.  As a result, 
policymakers should be suspicious in applying reassurance as an influence strategy to 
ns
C. 
these two countries were willing to reassu
tive reciprocal signals.   
 expand its territory, or seek economic dominance over the reassuree, or otherwise 
intend aggressive or defensive actions.  Simply sending a signal of reassurance in a 
securitized issue may not be enough to prompt reciprocation.  In the first two case 
studies, a colonial heritage of suspicion hampered most initiatives at rapprochement.  The 
former colonies in each case, Morocco and Libya, demonstrated expansionist ambitions 
and aggressive behavior that concerned Spain and Italy, the former co
orocco and Libya convinced Spain and Italy that they did not seek expansion, 
and would not act offensively, did Spain and Italy reciprocate.  Morocco’s concession of 
its territorial waters for fishing and acknowledgment of Western Sahara autonomy went a 
long way in reassuring Spain.  Libya’s renunciation of international terrorism and its 
moderation of pan-Arabist rhetoric went a long way in reassuring Italy. 
In contrast, the third and fourth case studies demonstrate how expansionist 
rhetoric hampers reassurance.  Nicaragua’s insistence on expanding its sovereignty over 
what had been considered for decades Colombian territorial waters negated the later 
attempt to reassure Colombia.  Likewise, the TRNC’s calls for international recognition 
of a separate Turkish Cypriot state hampered any effort of reassurance.  Essentially, an 
expansionist posture contradicts reassurance and n
expa ionist states. 
POLICY IMPLICATION 2:  DOMESTIC POLITICS ARE AN 
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION 
Despite a state’s intentions, domestic politics will oftentimes prevent that state’s 
leaders from sending a signal of reassurance, or reciprocating one.  Domestic politics is 
not always a constant, however, as it can also compel leaders to reassure stronger states.  
The second case study demonstrates the power of domestic politics, as Qadhafi needed 
international support in fending off internal challenges to his regime.  Likewise, 
Morocco’s King Mohammed needed international legitimacy in order to quell domestic 
dissent, especially given the threat of Islamist groups inside the country.  As a result, 
re their European adversaries and receive 
effec
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 Andres dispute served as this cry, as 
Ortega 
OMPLEMENTED WITH LARGER SIGNALS  
In the third case study, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega needed a rallying cry around an 
issue in order to uphold his grip on power.  The San
invoked the dispute as an excuse for the nation’s deteriorating economic and 
social conditions.  In the fourth case study, a great majority of the Greek Cypriots 
opposed Clerides’ signal of reassurance to the Turkish Cypriots.  The perceived soft 
stance on the TRNC likely caused Clerides’ defeat in the 2003 elections.  
Domestic politics stand in the way of meaningful reassurance exchanges in 
current international disputes.  For example, eliminating the U.S. embargo on Cuba could 
go a long way in inviting reciprocal signals from the Caribbean adversary.  But U.S. 
domestic politics has prevented the lifting of the embargo for decades.  Reassuring 
developing countries by engaging in meaningful reforms to reduce the human input to 
climate change is also being hampered by U.S. domestic politics.  Russian domestic 
politics is standing in the way of a meaningful reassurance exchange between Russia and 
former Soviet satellites in Europe and the Caucasus, as the desire to demonstrate Russian 
strength remains important to domestic audiences.  In Latin America, domestic politics 
hampers efforts at reassurance between Chile and Bolivia, who for over a century have 
disputed coastal territory in the Atacama Desert.400    
D. POLICY IMPLICATION 3: SMALL SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE 
MUST BE EVENTUALLY C
The costly signal dilemma can only be overcome with meaningful signals of 
reassurance.  Since it is unlikely that a state will initiate a reassurance exchange with a 
costly signal, the best alternative is to start with small signals that can build over time.  
This thesis concludes that the school of thought advocated by Charles Osgood and Janice 
Stein, which advocates the potential of small signals of reassurance that can lead to more 
costly signals, is a more realistic approach to examining the effects of reassurance than 
Kydd’s school of thought, which advocates costly signals as the only form of effective 
reassurance.  This thesis does not dispute the significance of costly signals; it merely 
concludes that less costly signals are more likely to be exchanged before any costly signal 
                                                 
400 Class notes, NS 4560 Seminar on Latin America Security, Professor Marcus Berger. Monterey, 
CA. 
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ceived as bait for exploitation, as Nicaragua’s 
not sw
and the all signals between Turkey and Greece, did not 
amount
es that 
can include asymmetric threats.  In the post-Cold War world, asymmetric threats are 
increas
gion tend to increase insecurity for local tribes, and for this reason may not be as 
effective as reassuring the tribal groups through institution building, education, and 
econom
ilean Government’s signals of reassurance towards the 
is sent.  In other words, states that wish to reassure will tend to “test the waters” with 
small signals before engaging in more costly ones. 
Case study 1 demonstrates the potential of small signals.  While Morocco’s 
fisheries concessions were not particularly costly signals, they led to costlier signals such 
as a moderating tone on the Western Sahara issue by both Spain and Morocco.  The 
fisheries agreement led to costlier signals.  In the second case study, however, Libya 
started a reassurance exchange with a costly signal, namely the handover of the 
Lockerbie terrorists.  This case study is an exception to this finding.  Case study 3 
demonstrates how a small signal can be per
offer to conduct joint patrols with the Colombian Navy along the maritime boundary did 
ay Colombia to reciprocate.  In case study #4, small signals between the TRNC 
 Republic of Cyprus, as well as sm
 to much.  The mutual support achieved following the Greek and Turkish 
earthquakes was perceived as a promising start to a Greek-Turkish rapprochement that 
would spread to Cyprus.  But because the cost of these signals did not increase, the 
exchange stalled, as specific demands by Cyprus (Turkish withdrawal from the TRNC) 
and the TRNC (international recognition of the TRNC) were never met nor approached. 
E. POLICY IMPLICATION 4:  SECURITIZED ISSUES INCLUDE 
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 
As explained in Chapter II, reassurance should not only apply to traditional 
security issues such as arms races and troop buildups, but also to securitized issu
ingly important when it comes to employing influence strategies such as 
reassurance.  For example, reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will do little to reassure 
Islamic extremists in Asia, while fostering a solution to the Israel-Palestinian dispute 
might.  Furthermore, attacks on Taliban strongholds in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border 
re
ic aid.  In states with powerful ethnic minorities, reassurance can also take place 
domestically.  For example, the Ch
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of the state as well as the 
oil resources, the government can reassure the people of the Niger Delta by improving 
reassur
d of withdrawing the Turkish troops has increased to the 
point th
Nicaraguan case some legitimacy and eventually, it may become more convenient to 
to  
 
                                                
Mapuche Tribe in issues such as commerce, governance, and religious freedom may 
succeed in resolving an internal conflict that has persisted throughout Chilean history.401  
In Nigeria, where insurgent groups are threatening the cohesion 
their quality of life and cracking down on the out-of-control corruption.  This type of 
ance can lead to fewer attacks by groups like the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND).402  In all, a policymaker needs to consider securitized issues 
when crafting a policy of reassurance.  Much further study is needed on this aspect of 
what can be coined “internal reassurance.” 
F. POLICY IMPLICATION 5:  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REASSURANCE 
DIMINISHES WHEN A PREVIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE STATUS QUO 
COMES TO BE PREFERRED 
Case Study 4 demonstrates how an unacceptable status quo can become 
acceptable over time and dash the hopes of a meaningful reassurance exchange.  When 
30,000 Turkish troops entered Cyprus in 1974, the UN condemned the invasion and 
called for an immediate withdrawal.  Over the years this demand has stood, but the sense 
of urgency has diminished.  Today, the Cyprus impasse has become “convenient.”  The 
cost of rebuilding the North an
at maintaining the status quo seems more advantageous than beginning a period 
of rapprochement through reassurance.  This scenario can be seen in numerous other 
regions, where an age-long dispute has assumed a sense of permanency that makes a 
“peace initiative” by either side much harder to send. 
This scenario seems to be what Daniel Ortega seeks with respect to San Andres 
and the surrounding territorial waters.  By making the dispute “permanent,” it gives the 
leave the dispute “as is” than to seek a meaningful solution.  This scenario also applies 
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 can be exploited to the extent that they can 
worsen
ctober 1925.406  The treaty 
involved a series of security guarantees among the Great Powers of the time, and 
involved Germany’s application for membership in the League of Nations.  Although 
Germany’s acceptance of the treaty reassured France and Britain, Germany also signed 
bilateral treaties with Russia that kept suspicions high in Paris and London.407  
Furthermore, German domestic politics kept the government from seeking full 
                                                
the animosity between Cuba and the United States, as well as Ethiopia-Eritrea, India-
Pakistan, and Algeria-Morocco.  The opportunities for further study on the effect of time 
on lingering disputes are vast. 
G. THE CAVEAT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITATION 
The outcome of a promising reassurance exchange after the end of World War I 
demonstrates how signals of reassurance
—not improve—the situation.  The end of World War I left Europe in shambles.  
A centuries-long deep mistrust between states had only deepened, and the victorious 
Allies appeared more concerned about Germany’s future than before The Great War.  In 
particular, France was greatly concerned over a future German attack.  The costly signals 
needed to reassure the French included a complete German disarmament and the 
occupation of the Rhineland.403  To make matters worse, German antagonism would play 
into the hands of the Soviet Union, which was also a potential adversary for the allies.404  
Russia pressured Germany to end negotiations with Britain and France, as an alliance 
would undermine the Russo-German bond that had been established in the Treaty of 
Rapallo in 1922.405  Germany chose to negotiate with both the Western powers and the 
Soviet Union at the same time. 
Germany accepted to the Treaty of Locarno on 16 O
 
403 John Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy:  Germany and the West, (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1972), 8.   
404 Stephanie Salzmann, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union:  Rapallo and After, 1922–
1934, (New York:  The Boydell Press, 2003), 58. 
id., 68. 
405 Ibid., 27, 60–61. 
406 Ib
407 Ibid., 70.   
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rapprochement with the We erman disarmament.  But 
German economic prosperity “raised hopes for a return to great power status.”408  
d 
exporte  the 




this pro nce 
will mu ld not be used in 
tegy 
may be uld be 
resent ach situation is ever changing, 
en 
ay, the ad to rapprochement, 
g the 
conditi y 
otentially avert war.  Nevertheless, the dynamics behind confidence building between 
           
st.  The goal of Locarno was G
Despite promises to disarm, Germany imported poison gas from the Soviet Union, an
d arms to Russia.409  By 1930, it was clear that initial signals of reassurance to
ad not brougW
Germany time to rearm, and by 1933, after more reassurance attempts by Brit
 tensions led to an imminent war.  
The detail behind the “Spirit of Locarno” is beyond the scope of this thesis.  B
minent episode in history demonstrates that in some circumstances, deterre
ch more likely prevent a war than reassurance.  Reassurance shou
every instance.  Indeed, a policy of deterrence, compellence, or another influence stra
 a better choice.  This thesis has argued the case of four conditions that sho
for a signal of reassurance to be reciprocated.  Ep
and while some of these conditions may be present in a particular scenario on a giv
y may not be present the following day.  Reassurance can led
or, like in the case of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, war.  Understandin
ons that increase the likelihood for reassurance to lead to rapprochement ma
p
nations will always be challenging, and merit further study. 
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